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Section 107 of the Internal Revenue Code excludes from gross in-
come the value of in-kind housing and cash parsonage allowances pro-
vided to “minister[s] of the gospel.”1 During the course of the celebrated 
Warren litigation,2 several commentators (including me3) predicted 
that, if that litigation were dismissed, a subsequent challenge would 
eventually be mounted to the constitutionality of Section 107. This pre-
diction has come to fruition. Warren was dismissed in 2002 and now, in 
Freedom from Religion Foundation v. Geithner,4 the Freedom from Reli-
gion Foundation (FFRF), for itself and its members, argues that Section 
107 and the income tax exclusion that section grants to “minister[s] of 
the gospel” violate the Establishment Clause5 of the First Amendment.6 
However, we did not predict that, when the constitutionality of 
Section 107 was again questioned in court, the case would have implica-
tions for a new federal law mandating that individuals maintain “mini-
mum essential” health care coverage for themselves and their depend-
ents.7 The individual health care mandate established by the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)8 and the Health Care and 
 
 1 I.R.C. § 107 (2006). 
 2 Warren v. Comm’r, 302 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2002) (dismissing appeal after stipulations by 
parties); Warren v. Comm’r, 282 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002) (appointing amicus curiae and 
requesting supplemental briefing); Warren v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 343 (2000). For a discussion of 
the Warren controversy, see John R. Dorocak, The Income Tax Exclusion of the Housing Allow-
ance for Ministers of the Gospel Per I.R.C. Section 107: First Amendment Establishment of Reli-
gion or Free Exercise Thereof—Where Should the Warren Court Have Gone?, 54 SAN DIEGO. L. 
REV. 233 (2009). 
 3 The commentary on Warren was voluminous. For my contribution to the Warren oeu-
vre, see Edward A. Zelinsky, Dr. Warren, Section 107 and the Court-Appointed Amicus, 96 TAX 
NOTES 1267 (2002); Edward A. Zelinsky, Dr. Warren, Section 107, and Texas Monthly: A Reply, 
95 TAX NOTES 1663 (2002), reprinted in 37 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 33 (2002); Edward A. 
Zelinsky, Dr. Warren, The Parsonage Exclusion, and the First Amendment, 95 TAX NOTES 115 
(2002), reprinted in 36 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 185 (2002). 
 4 715 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (E.D. Cal. 2010); see also Freedom from Religion Found. v. 
Geithner, 644 F.3d 836 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming in part and reversing in part with respect to 
clergyman’s motion to intervene). 
 5 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion . . . .”). 
 6 The FFRF complaint also challenges the constitutionality of I.R.C. § 265(a)(6) and the 
constitutionality of CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17131.6 (West 2012) which, with modification, 
incorporates the parsonage allowance into the California income tax. Complaint ¶¶ 32–40, 
Freedom from Religion Found. v. Geithner, 262 F.R.D. 527 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (No. CIV. 09-2894 
WBS DAD). 
 7 I.R.C. § 5000A (West 2012); see also Edward A. Zelinsky, The Health-Related Tax Provi-
sions of PPACA and HCERA: Contingent, Complex, Incremental and Lacking Cost Controls 
§ 7.02[6], in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND EXECUTIVE COM-
PENSATION (Alvin D. Lurie ed., 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1633556. 
 8 Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1501(b), 10106(b)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 244, 909 (2010). 
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Education Reconciliation Act (HCERA) of 20109 contains two religious 
exemptions.10 One of these exemptions incorporates a pre-existing reli-
gious exemption from the federal self-employment tax.11 These sectari-
an exemptions raise the same First Amendment issues as does the 
Code’s exclusion of clerical housing from gross income. In First 
Amendment terms, Section 107, the federal health mandate’s religious 
exemptions, and the religious exemptions from the Federal Insurance 
Contributions Act (FICA) and the self-employment taxes raise the pos-
sibilities of unconstitutional subsidization of religion and of excessive 
entanglement between church and state. 
I write to evaluate the claim that Section 107 is unconstitutional 
because of the entanglement it causes and to explore the implications of 
that claim for the religious exemptions from the new federal health care 
mandate, as well as the religious exemptions from the taxes financing 
Social Security. While the constitutionality vel non of the new health 
care mandate has been controversial,12 commentators have largely ig-
nored the issue of the constitutionality of the health mandate’s two reli-
gious exemptions. 
I ultimately reject the indictment of Section 107 as impermissibly 
entangling church and state. For the same reasons, I also conclude that 
the religious exemptions of the Social Security taxes and of the individu-
al health mandate pass First Amendment muster. Extensive contact 
between modern tax systems and religious institutions is unavoidable. 
Whether religious entities and actors are taxed or exempted, there are 
no disentangling alternatives, just imperfect trade-offs between different 
forms of entanglement. 
If religious institutions and actors are taxed, they are subjected to 
the inherently intrusive relationship between the tax collector and the 
taxpayer. If religious institutions and actors are not taxed, there are in-
evitable tensions policing the borderlines of exemption. In the contem-
porary tax context, there is no way to prevent significant entanglement 
between mega-churches and mega-governments. Rather, the inevitable 
choice is between borderline entanglement and enforcement entangle-
ment. 
 
 9 Pub. L. No. 111-152, §§ 1002, 1004, 124 Stat. 1029, 1032, 1034 (2010). 
 10 I.R.C. § 5000A(d)(2) (West 2012). 
 11 Id. § 1402(g) (West 2012). 
 12 Compare Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011), with Florida 
ex rel Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. 
granted 132 S. Ct 604 (2011); see also CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REQUIRING INDIVIDUALS TO 
OBTAIN HEALTH INSURANCE: A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, at R40725 (2010), available at 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40725_ 20090724.pdf. The CRS has discussed the constitution-
al issues surrounding the religious exemptions of the individual health care mandate. Id. at 20–
25. 
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Section 107 and the exclusion from gross income it grants to cleri-
cal recipients of housing and parsonage allowances are constitutionally 
permitted, though not constitutionally required,13 responses to the al-
ternative forms of entanglement inherent in the relationship between 
modern government and religion. Similarly, the Code’s sectarian ex-
emptions from the individual health care mandate and from the FICA 
and self-employment taxes are acceptable, though not obligatory, means 
under the First Amendment of managing the inevitable contacts and 
tensions between the contemporary state and the religious community. 
Through these exemptions, Congress plausibly chooses entanglement 
between church and state at the borders of exemption rather than the 
entanglement of enforcing tax laws against religious entities and their 
personnel. Entanglement between church and state is inevitable whether 
the modern tax law exempts or taxes sectarian institutions and actors. 
This reality undermines the characterization of Section 107 and other 
tax exemptions as subsidies of religion since there is a credible, non-
subsidizing rationale for each of these Code provisions, i.e., the man-
agement of tax-related entanglement between church and state, given 
the inexorable and imperfect trade-off between enforcement entangle-
ment and borderline entanglement. 
However, that a particular tax exemption is constitutionally per-
mitted does not mean that it is a good idea in terms of tax policy. As a 
matter of such policy, the exclusion of Section 107(2) for cash parsonage 
allowances stands on weaker ground than does the exclusion of Section 
107(1) for in-kind housing provided to “minister[s] of the gospel.” The 
church-state entanglement inherent in taxing noncash income is partic-
ularly acute in light of the valuation and liquidity problems of taxing 
such noncash income. In contrast, the taxation of cash parsonage allow-
ances, unlike the taxation of housing provided in-kind, does not involve 
quandaries of valuation or of taxpayer liquidity and is thus less entan-
gling as a constitutional matter and more practicable as a matter of tax 
policy. 
The advisability of the parsonage allowance has recently come into 
particular focus as a result of three developments: the investigation of 
“media-based ministries” by the staff of Senator Grassley, former rank-
 
 13 I leave for another day the interesting issue whether the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act of 1993 (RFRA) would require these exemptions even if the Constitution does not. While 
the Supreme Court has declared RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the states and their mu-
nicipalities, it remains in effect as to the federal government itself. See Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–
2000bb-4 (2006)); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (holding that RFRA “ex-
ceeds Congress’ power” under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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ing member of the Senate Finance Committee;14 the subsequent an-
nouncement of the Evangelical Council for Financial Accountability 
(ECFA) that, in response to Senator Grassley’s concerns, it has estab-
lished a Commission on Accountability and Policy for Religious Organ-
izations to consider, among other issues, “whether legislation is needed 
to curb abuses of the clergy housing allowance exclusion”;15 and the 
decision by the closely-divided U.S. Tax Court that the parsonage allow-
ance may be awarded to a “minister of the gospel” for more than one 
home.16 Out of these developments have emerged proposals for a dollar 
cap on the parsonage allowance exclusion and the limitation of the al-
lowance to a minister’s single residence.17 However, the allowance, paid 
in cash, should, as a matter of tax policy, be jettisoned altogether. While 
the allowance is constitutional as a plausible choice to avoid enforce-
ment entanglement by accepting borderline entanglement, the cash 
nature of such allowances suggests that such allowances should be taxed 
along with other clerical compensation paid in cash. In First Amend-
ment terms, taxing cash compensation, while it enmeshes church and 
state, enmeshes them less than taxing in-kind income. 
The first five parts of this Article establish the background for my 
analysis. The first part describes the Supreme Court’s Establishment 
Clause decisions concerning religious entanglement. These cases high-
light the inevitable choice between borderline entanglement and en-
forcement entanglement. The second part of this Article outlines Code 
Section 107, which excludes from ministers’ gross incomes housing and 
housing allowances, and Code Section 119, which more generally ex-
cludes from employees’ incomes certain employer-provided housing. 
The third part of this Article explores the religious exemptions from the 
two taxes which finance Social Security benefits, the FICA tax on wages, 
and the federal self-employment tax. The fourth part of this Article dis-
cusses the religious exemptions of the new federal health insurance 
mandate on individuals while the fifth part describes the Warren litiga-
tion and FFRF’s complaint against Section 107. 
 
 14 Memorandum from Theresa Pattera & Sean Barnet to Senator Grassley on Review of 
Media-Based Ministries (Jan. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Grassley Staff Memo], available at http://
finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/download/?id=1f92d378-baa2-440d-9fbd-333cdc5d85fc. 
 15 ECFA to Lead Independent Commission on Major Accountability and Policy Issues for 
Churches and Other Religious Organization, ECFA.ORG (Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.ecfa.org/
Content/ECFA-to-Lead-Independent-Commission-on-Major-Accountability-and-Policy-
Issues-for-Churches-and-Other-Religious-Organizations. 
 16 Driscoll v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 557 (2010), rev’d, No. 11-12454, 2012 WL 384834 (11th Cir. 
Feb. 8, 2012); see also Laura Saunders, Tax Relief for Clergy Is Questioned, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 23, 
2011, at C1. 
 17 Grassley Staff Memo, supra note 14, at 15 (noting that among “issues for consideration” 
are “[s]hould the parsonage allowance be limited to a single primary residence or to a specific 
dollar amount?”). 
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Against this background, the sixth part of this Article concludes 
that Section 107 is not a tax “subsidy” because it serves a nonsubsidizing 
purpose, i.e., the management of tax-related entanglement between 
church and state by eschewing enforcement entanglement at the price of 
borderline entanglement. The seventh part of this Article contends that 
invalidating Section 107 will not reduce church-state entanglement, but 
will merely shift the nature of such entanglement from policing the bor-
derlines of exemption to the enforcement of housing-related income tax 
against religious employers and individuals. The entanglement prob-
lems of taxing noncash income, such as housing provided to clerical 
employees, are particularly acute given the valuation and liquidation 
quandaries of taxing in-kind income. These problems reinforce the de-
cision embodied in Section 107 to opt for the difficulties of borderline 
entanglement over the costs of enforcement entanglement. The eighth 
part of this Article places the discussion in the context of Section 119 
and highlights the extent to which repealing Section 107 would, in sig-
nificant measure, refocus the tax law upon the enmeshing questions 
involved in determining the boundaries of Section 119. The ninth part 
of this Article rejects the possibility of holding Section 107 unconstitu-
tional while simultaneously forbidding Section 119’s exclusion to reli-
gious employers and their employees. Among its other defects, this ap-
proach would entangle the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and religious 
entities in determining which employers are religious and therefore 
barred from Section 119. There is, moreover, a serious problem under 
the Free Exercise Clause if only religious employers and their workers 
are precluded from Section 119 and its income tax exclusion of employ-
er-provided housing. 
The tenth part of this Article concludes that, while Section 107 is 
constitutional as a permissible approach to managing entanglement 
between the IRS and religious entities and their ministers, Section 
107(2) is not persuasive as a matter of tax policy. The recipients of cash 
parsonage allowances have liquidity to pay income tax; there are no 
valuation problems taxing cash. Hence, as a matter of tax policy, par-
sonage allowances should be taxed. In First Amendment terms, taxing 
cash compensation does not enmesh church and state as severely as 
would the taxation of clerical housing provided in-kind. The repeal of 
Section 107(2) is preferable to the alternatives of capping the dollar 
amount of the parsonage allowance or limiting the allowance to a single 
clerical home. 
The eleventh part of this Article concludes that, just as Section 107 
is constitutional as a permissible means of managing the inevitable 
church-state entanglement trade-offs under the modern income tax, the 
religious exemptions under the individual health mandate, the FICA 
tax, and the self-employment tax are all constitutionally permitted, 
Zelinsky.33-4 (Do Not Delete) 3/25/2012 3:35 PM 
2012] RE LIG IO U S  T AX E X E MPT IO N S  1639 
though not constitutionally required. In these contexts also, the inevita-
ble choice is between the problems of borderline entanglement and the 
quandaries of enforcement entanglement. Through these tax exemp-
tions, Congress has reasonably and constitutionally opted to avoid the 
difficulties of enforcing the tax law against religious actors and institu-
tions by accepting the problems of policing the borders of tax exemp-
tion for such actors and institutions. 
The final part of this Article briefly places my conclusions into the 
context of controversy over the three-part Lemon test18 and the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church 
and School v. EEOC.19 One of the three elements of the Lemon First 
Amendment test is entanglement. Whatever the value in other settings 
of the concept of entanglement, that concept is of limited (typically no) 
use in assessing the First Amendment status of tax laws since, given the 
realities of modern tax systems, there are no disentangling alternatives. 
In the tax context, the only choices are to tax sectarian institutions and 
actors (and thus incur the problems of enforcement entanglement) or to 
exempt such institutions and actors (and thus experience the problems 
of borderline entanglement). 
While the constitutionality vel non of Section 107 is important in 
and of itself, more is at stake in Freedom from Religion Foundation than 
the First Amendment status of the federal income tax exclusion for cler-
ical housing and parsonage allowances. The ultimate issue raised by this 
litigation is whether federal, state and local tax statutes can, consistent 
with the First Amendment, contain religious exemptions. If Section 107 
unconstitutionally entangles church and state as FFRF argues, so too do 
the statutory exemptions from the new federal health care mandate as 
do the sectarian exemptions from the Social Security taxes. By the same 
token, if Section 107 passes First Amendment muster (as I conclude it 
does), the religious exemptions of the individual health care mandate 
and of the self-employment and FICA taxes are likewise constitutional. 
These exemptions permissibly implement the plausible (though not 
compelled) choice to incur the problems of borderline enforcement 
rather than the difficulties of enforcement entanglement, a reasonable 
choice in a world of imperfect trade-offs between entangling alterna-
tives. Whether the government chooses to tax religious actors and insti-
tutions or to exempt them, there are no disentangling alternatives. 
 
 18 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
 19 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
Zelinsky.33-4 (Do Not Delete) 3/25/2012 3:35 PM 
1640 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 33:4 
 
I.     THE SUPREME COURT’S ENTANGLEMENT DECISIONS: BORDERLINE 
ENTANGLEMENT V. ENFORCEMENT ENTANGLEMENT 
 
The history of contemporary20 First Amendment entanglement law 
starts with Walz v. Tax Commission.21 The majority opinion in Walz 
focused on enforcement entanglement, the intrusion into internal 
church operations which results when the church is taxed and upon the 
protection of religious institutions’ autonomy when those institutions 
are excluded from the tax base. Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Walz 
highlights the borderline entanglement stemming from religious ex-
emptions, the entanglement which flows from the need to define and 
police the boundaries of such exemptions. These two opinions—the first 
focusing upon sectarian autonomy, the second concentrating on border-
line enforcement—illustrate the entanglement concerns at play when 
analyzing the constitutionality of Section 107 and the religious exemp-
tions of the individual health care mandate and of the self-employment 
and FICA taxes. 
In Walz, an owner of taxable real property mounted a First 
Amendment challenge to New York’s property tax exemption for “real 
or personal property used exclusively for religious . . . purposes.”22 In a 
majority opinion for himself and five of his colleagues, Chief Justice 
Burger declared such exemption constitutional as reflecting “a benevo-
lent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without 
sponsorship and without interference.”23 Chief Justice Burger placed the 
tax exemption for religious property in the context of the exemptions 
simultaneously extended to “a broad class of property owned by non-
profit, quasipublic corporations which include hospitals, libraries, play-
grounds, scientific, professional, historical, and patriotic groups.”24 He 
also observed that the purpose of New York’s “property tax exemption 
is neither the advancement nor the inhibition of religion.”25 Rather, 
New York “has an affirmative policy that considers these groups as ben-
 
 20 The Supreme Court’s earlier opinions in Murdock and Follett suggest that, under certain 
circumstances, the First Amendment sometimes compels tax exemption for religious activity. 
See Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 
(1943). However, these decisions play little role in the Court’s contemporary First Amendment 
doctrine which views sectarian tax exemptions as permitted rather than compelled. Edward A. 
Zelinsky, Are Tax “Benefits” for Religious Institutions Constitutionally Dependent on Benefits for 
Secular Entities?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 805, 830 (2001). 
 21 397 U.S. 664 (1970). For more on Walz, see Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax “Benefits” 
Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?, 112 HARV. L. REV. 379, 392–95 (1998). 
 22 Id. at 666–67 (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 1). 
 23 Id. at 669. 
 24 Id. at 672–73. 
 25 Id. at 672. 
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eficial and stabilizing influences in community life and finds this classi-
fication useful, desirable, and in the public interest.”26 
Moreover, while tax exemption yields “an indirect economic bene-
fit” to the exempted religious institutions, such exemption also mini-
mizes “entanglement” between the government and those institutions.27 
The tax exemption of church property, wrote Chief Justice Burger, rec-
ognizes “the autonomy and freedom of religious bodies”28 and “creates 
only a minimal and remote involvement between church and state and 
far less than taxation of churches. It restricts the fiscal relationship be-
tween church and state, and tends to complement and reinforce the 
desired separation insulating each from the other.”29 
Concurring, Justice Brennan justified the tax exemption of church-
es under the First Amendment because of the “nonreligious” benefits 
churches provide to the community as part of “a range of other private, 
nonprofit organizations.”30 Echoing Chief Justice Burger’s concern 
about possible entanglement between churches and the tax collector, 
Justice Brennan also declared that tax exemptions, in contrast to cash 
subsidies, “constitute mere passive state involvement with religion and 
not the affirmative involvement characteristic of outright governmental 
subsidy.”31 Taxing churches, no less than exempting them, “involve[s] 
[the government] with religion.”32 
In his concurrence, Justice Harlan, like his colleagues, noted the 
“broad and divergent groups”33 covered by New York’s property tax 
exemption. Since that exemption is “so sweeping,” Justice Harlan wrote, 
the exemption’s “administration need not entangle government in diffi-
cult classifications of what is or is not religious.”34 
While both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Harlan applied to their 
respective concerns the “entanglement” moniker, they raised different 
considerations. Chief Justice Burger’s entanglement concerns are en-
forcement-related, focused on the internal “autonomy” of religious in-
stitutions. Taxation is inherently intrusive, as anyone who has under-
gone a tax audit understands.35 Exempting religious institutions and 
their personnel from taxation “separat[es]” and “insulat[es]” govern-
 
 26 Id. at 673. 
 27 Id. at 674–76. 
 28 Id. at 672. 
 29 Id. at 675. 
 30 Id. at 687–88. 
 31 Id. at 691. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 696. 
 34 Id. at 698. 
 35 Professors Crimm and Winer agree. NINA J. CRIMM & LAWRENCE H. WINER, POLITICS, 
TAXES, AND THE PULPIT: PROVOCATIVE FIRST AMENDMENT CONFLICTS 176 (2011) (“Anyone 
who has been subject to an IRS audit appreciates how intrusive it can be.”). 
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ment and sectarian institutions from each other, thereby respecting the 
internal autonomy of such institutions.36 
Justice Harlan, by contrast, focused on the entanglement problems 
at the borderlines of exemption. The breadth of the New York property 
tax exemption reassured Justice Harlan that those problems were man-
ageable in Walz. However, Justice Harlan’s analysis suggests that a nar-
rower tax exemption than New York’s might fail First Amendment 
scrutiny as requiring excessively intrusive activity to police the exemp-
tion’s boundaries. 
One year after Walz, that decision’s “excessive entanglement” 
standard became one of the three components37 of the famous Lemon 
test. In Lemon v. Kurtzman,38 the Supreme Court, in an opinion by 
Chief Justice Burger, struck on First Amendment grounds Pennsylvania 
and Rhode Island statutes channeling financial assistance to nonpublic 
education. In particular, the Court declared that the statutes “involve[d] 
excessive entanglement between government and religion.”39 While the 
funds given by these states to religious schools were restricted to secular 
subjects, “[a] comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state sur-
veillance will inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions are 
obeyed. . . . These prophylactic contacts will involve excessive and en-
during entanglement between state and church.”40 This is the same en-
tanglement concern that the Chief Justice expressed in Walz, namely, 
the enforcement-related intrusion of the government into internal 
church autonomy as the government administers the law. In Lemon, the 
laws in question unconstitutionally impaired sectarian autonomy by 
requiring the states to audit religious schools to determine such schools’ 
compliance with the restrictions on the government funds the religious 
schools received. 
Lemon also invoked as an entanglement problem the possibility of 
political divisiveness along sectarian lines: “Here we are confronted with 
successive and very likely permanent annual appropriations that benefit 
relatively few religious groups. Political fragmentation and divisiveness 
on religious lines are thus likely to be intensified.”41 
Chief Justice Burger distinguished in two ways the Rhode Island 
and Pennsylvania statutes stricken in Lemon from the New York prop-
erty tax exemption upheld in Walz. The former required regular, annual 
 
 36 Walz, 397 U.S. at 675. 
 37 The other two elements of the Lemon test are intent and effect. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 12.2.3 (3d ed. 2006); RONALD D. ROTUNDA 
& JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 21.4(a)(v) (4th ed. 2008). 
 38 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 39 Id. at 614. 
 40 Id. at 619. 
 41 Id. at 623. 
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appropriations of public monies and thus heightened the danger of sec-
tarian political conflict.42 Moreover, the property tax exemption for 
churches has a long tradition.43 This history suggested to the Chief Jus-
tice that such exemption carries less potential for sectarian political divi-
sion than the new statutes recently adopted by the Ocean and Keystone 
states. These two factors—history and annual appropriations—indicate 
that the entanglement caused by Section 107 is not excessive. These fac-
tors are also at play when analyzing the constitutionality of the religious 
exemptions of the individual health care mandate and of the Social Se-
curity taxes. In addition, Lemon’s concern about ongoing administrative 
entanglement between church and state cautions against taxing religious 
institutions since taxation invariably involves continuing enforcement 
activity by the tax collector and continuing compliance activity by the 
religious taxpayer. 
The Burger and Harlan opinions in Walz identified the major 
themes that reappeared in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock44 when the 
Court addressed the First Amendment status of Texas’s sales tax exemp-
tion for religious literature: the economic value of tax exemption, the 
purpose for and effect of such exemption, the dangers of entangling the 
tax collector and religious actors. In Texas Monthly, Justice Brennan, 
writing for a three-justice plurality, struck the Texas sales tax exemption 
because it was limited to sales of religious publications. 
The facts in Texas Monthly were as straightforward as they were in 
Walz: For a three year period, Texas imposed sales and use taxes on the 
sale of secular publications like Texas Monthly magazine while exempt-
ing from such taxes the sale of religious periodicals and books.45 Texas 
Monthly, Inc., the publisher of Texas Monthly, collected and paid the 
taxes and then sued for a refund, claiming that the exemption for sales 
of religious publications violated the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. 
For himself, as well as Justices Marshall and Stevens, Justice Bren-
nan interpreted Walz as upholding the New York property tax exemp-
tion for churches only because the benefits of such exemption “flowed 
to a large number of nonreligious groups as well.”46 Equally critical for 
Justice Brennan was the proposition that “[e]very tax exemption consti-
tutes a subsidy.”47 Since exemption is subsidization, such subsidization 
cannot, consistent with the Establishment Clause, be directed “exclu-
sively to religious organizations.”48 
 
 42 Id. at 622. 
 43 Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970). 
 44 489 U.S. 1 (1989). 
 45 Id. at 5–6. 
 46 Id. at 11. 
 47 Id. at 14. 
 48 Id. at 15. 
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As to the entanglement considerations so prominent in Walz, Jus-
tice Brennan opined in Texas Monthly that the Texas sales tax exemp-
tion for religious periodicals “produce[s] greater state entanglement 
with religion than the denial of an exemption”49 since the state must 
determine which publications are religious and thus qualify for sales tax 
exemption. This is Justice Harlan’s borderline version of entanglement, 
the concern that a narrowly drawn exemption restricted to religious 
institutions engenders conflict as institutions seek to qualify for the ex-
emption. The state must police the boundaries of the exemption and 
determine which entities qualify for it. 
The fourth and fifth votes50 in Texas Monthly came from Justices 
Blackmun and O’Connor who concurred separately. Concluding that 
“[t]he Free Exercise Clause suggests that a special exemption for reli-
gious books is required” while “[t]he Establishment Clause suggests that 
a special exemption for religious books is forbidden,”51 Justice 
Blackmun proposed the “narrow resolution” of Texas Monthly: “[B]y 
confining the tax exemption exclusively to the sale of religious publica-
tions, Texas engaged in preferential support for the communication of 
religious messages.”52 Such “preference for the dissemination of reli-
gious ideas offends our most basic understanding of what the Estab-
lishment Clause is all about.”53 
In a blistering dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Kennedy, Justice Scalia found Walz “utterly dispositive” of Texas 
Monthly’s First Amendment challenge to the Texas sales tax exemption 
for sales of religious literature.54 Effectively dismissing as dicta Walz’s 
discussion of the exemption New York simultaneously extended to 
secular eleemosynary institutions in Walz, Justice Scalia opined, “[t]he 
Court did not approve an exemption for charities that happened to ben-
efit religion; it approved an exemption for religion as an exemption for 
religion.”55 
The First Amendment “principle of permissible accommodation”56 
permits exemptions limited to religious actors to preclude enforcement-
related entanglement of church and state: “[I]t is a permissible legisla-
tive purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference with the 
ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious 
 
 49 Id. at 20. 
 50 Justice White expressed no opinion on the Establishment Clause question, finding the 
Texas sales tax exemption a content-based exemption, barred by the Press Clause of the First 
Amendment. Id. at 26. 
 51 Id. at 27. 
 52 Id. at 28. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 36. 
 55 Id. at 38. 
 56 Id. at 39. 
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missions.”57 Such entanglement-avoiding exemptions, Justice Scalia 
argued, may “single[] out religious entities for a benefit, rather than 
benefiting a broad grouping of which religious organizations are only a 
part.”58 
In Texas Monthly, Justice Brennan declared that the Texas sales tax 
exemption “appears, on its face, to produce greater state entanglement 
with religion than the denial of an exemption.”59 In Walz, Chief Justice 
Burger advanced the opposite claim, that tax exemption “creates only a 
minimal and remote involvement between church and state and far less 
than taxation of churches.”60 At one level, these seemingly contradictory 
assertions can be reconciled by the nature of the specific taxes each jus-
tice confronted. Because of valuation disputes61 and liquidity concerns, 
ad valorem property taxation (like the taxation of in-kind fringe bene-
fits) arguably is more entangling than is sales taxation, aimed at cash 
transactions. 
At another level, however, there is no easily applied metric for de-
termining whether policing tax exemption borderlines generates greater 
entanglement between church and state than does taxing sectarian insti-
tutions and actors. Thus, the tension between Chief Justice Burger’s 
Walz opinion and Justice Brennan’s opinion in Texas Monthly high-
lights the reality that, in the context of tax exemptions for religious insti-
tutions and actors, there are no disentangling alternatives. There is only 
the choice between borderline entanglement and enforcement entan-
glement. 
 
II.     CODE SECTIONS 107 AND 119 
 
Section 10762 excludes from the gross income of a “minister of the 
gospel” 
(1) the rental value of a home furnished to him as part of his com-
pensation; or 
(2) the rental allowance paid to him as part of his compensation, to 
the extent used by him to rent or provide a home and to the extent 
 
 57 Id. (quoting Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987)). 
 58 Id. (quoting Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints, 483 U.S. at 333). 
 59 Id. at 20. 
 60 Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970). 
 61 On the myriad valuation disputes which arise under systems of ad valorem property 
taxation, see WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 802 (9th ed. 2009); JOAN YOUNGMAN, LEGAL ISSUES IN PROPERTY VALUATION AND TAXA-
TION: CASES AND MATERIALS 33 (2006). 
 62 I.R.C. § 107 (2006). 
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such allowance does not exceed the fair rental value of the home, in-
cluding furnishings and appurtenances such as a garage, plus the cost 
of utilities. 
Cash payments excluded from a clergyman’s gross income pursu-
ant to Section 107(2) have come to be denoted as “parsonage allow-
ance.”63 
For purposes of Section 107, the U.S. Tax Court has construed the 
term “minister of the gospel” to include a full-time cantor in a conserva-
tive synagogue.64 However, the Tax Court denied the parsonage allow-
ance exclusion to a Baptist “minister of education” on the grounds that 
he was not a “minister of the gospel.”65 
To qualify for the Section 107 exclusion, it is not enough that a re-
cipient of in-kind housing or of a cash parsonage allowance be a “minis-
ter of the gospel.” In addition, the regulations construing Section 107 
specify that the clerical recipient must receive his housing or cash allow-
ance as compensation for performing services “ordinarily” associated 
with a religious ministry. In particular, the Treasury regulations restrict 
the Section 107 exclusion to the value of a home or a parsonage allow-
ance which constitutes “remuneration for services which are ordinarily 
the duties of a minister of the gospel.”66 Such duties “include perfor-
mance of sacerdotal functions, the conduct of religious worship, the 
administration and maintenance of religious organizations and their 
integral agencies, and the performance of teaching and administrative 
duties at theological seminaries.”67 
Thus, for example, an ordained rabbi was denied the parsonage al-
lowance exclusion because his service as “the national director of Inter-
religious Affairs for the American Jewish Committee . . . was not a min-
isterial function” for purposes of Section 107.68 Similarly, a Baptist 
minister employed by the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade was 
denied the exclusion because “the preaching of anticommunism [is not] 
the conduct of religious worship.”69 Likewise, the Treasury regulations 
conclude that a clergyman is not performing services in the exercise of 
his ministry when he teaches “history and mathematics” at a secular 
university.70 
In contrast, the regulations indicate that duties as a university 
chaplain “which include the conduct of religious worship, offering spir-
itual counsel to the university students, and teaching a class in religion” 
 
 63 See, e.g., Warren v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 343, 346 (2000). 
 64 Silverman v. Comm’r, 57 T.C. 727 (1972). 
 65 Lawrence v. Comm’r, 50 T.C. 494 (1968). 
 66 Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1(a) (as amended in 1963). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Tanenbaum v. Comm’r, 58 T.C. 1, 9 (1972). 
 69 Colbert v. Comm’r, 61 T.C. 449, 456 (1974). 
 70 Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(c)-5(c)(2) (as amended in 1968). 
Zelinsky.33-4 (Do Not Delete) 3/25/2012 3:35 PM 
2012] RE LIG IO U S  T AX E X E MPT IO N S  1647 
constitute services in the exercise of a ministry.71 Similarly, according to 
the regulations, a minister performs services in the exercise of his minis-
try when he works full-time for “the N Religious Board to serve as direc-
tor of one of its departments.” “The N Religious Board is an integral 
agency of O, a religious organization operating under the authority of a 
religious body constituting a church denomination.”72 Moreover, a min-
ister performs services in the exercise of his ministry when he is as-
signed full-time by his church “to perform advisory service to Y Com-
pany in connection with the publication of a book dealing with the 
history of M’s church denomination.”73 
Much of this regulatory framework implements the ministerial ex-
emption from the self-employment tax and is incorporated by refer-
ence74 for purposes of Section 107 and that section’s exclusion of hous-
ing and housing allowances provided to “minister[s] of the gospel.” 
Consequently, if these regulations unduly entangle for purposes of Sec-
tion 107, they also unconstitutionally entangle for purposes of the self-
employment tax under which these regulations are promulgated. 
To be excludable from gross income under Section 107(2), a par-
sonage allowance must be designated as such “in an employment con-
tract, in minutes of or in a resolution by a church or other qualified or-
ganization or in its budget, or in any other appropriate instrument 
evidencing such official action.”75 In addition, the allowance must be 
used “(1) for rent of a home, (2) for purchase of a home, and (3) for 
expenses directly related to providing a home.”76 Outlays for “food and 
servants” do not qualify for exclusion.77 The parsonage allowance can-
not “exceed the fair rental value of the home, including furnishings and 
appurtenances such as a garage, plus the cost of utilities.”78 
Although housing and parsonage allowances provided to ministers 
are excludable from such ministers’ gross incomes for income tax pur-
poses, such housing and allowances are subject to the self-employment 
tax.79 
In contrast to Section 107 and its exclusion for in-kind housing and 
cash parsonage allowances limited to “minister[s] of the gospel,” Code 
 
 71 Id. § 1.1402(c)-5(b)(2)(iii). 
 72 Id. § 1.1402(c)-5(b)(2)(iv).  
 73 Id. § 1.1402(c)-5(b)(2)(v). 
 74 Id. § 1.107-1(a) (as amended in 1963) (“In general, the rules provided in § 1.1402(c)-5 
will be applicable to such determination.”). 
 75 Id. § 1.107-1(b) (as amended in 1963). 
 76 Id. § 1.107-1(c) (as amended in 1968). 
 77 Id. 
 78 I.R.C. § 107(a)(2) (2006) (as amended by the Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification Act 
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-181, 116 Stat. 583, generally effective for years starting on or after 
January 1, 2002.) 
 79 Id. § 1402(a)(8) (West 2012). 
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Section 11980 provides a general income tax exclusion for housing fur-
nished in-kind by employers to their respective employees. To qualify 
for this exclusion from gross income, “lodging” must be “furnished” to 
“an employee . . . by or on behalf of his employer for the convenience of 
the employer.”81 In addition, to qualify for the Section 119 exclusion, 
“the employee [must be] required to accept such lodging on the business 
premises of his employer as a condition of his employment.”82 
Unlike Section 107, which excludes from gross income both in-
kind housing and cash parsonage allowances furnished to “minister[s] 
of the gospel,” “Section 119 applies only to . . . lodging furnished in 
kind.”83 
 
III.     THE RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS OF THE FICA AND  
SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAXES 
 
The Federal Social Security system pays retirement, death, disabil-
ity, and medical benefits84 to individuals who pay the taxes financing 
such benefits.85 These benefits are funded through two federal taxes, one 
levied on employees’ wages and one assessed on self-employment in-
come. 
In the case of an individual who is an employee covered by the So-
cial Security system, the employee86 and the employer87 jointly pay these 
taxes, commonly denoted as FICA88 taxes. Specifically, if an individual 
earns “wages” (a statutorily defined term89) from his “employment” 
(also a statutorily defined term90), the employer withholds FICA taxes 
 
 80 Id. § 119(a) (2006). 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. § 119(a)(2) (2006). 
 83 Comm’r v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 84 (1977) (quoting S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 4825 
(1954)). 
 84 For a summary of the benefits paid by the Social Security system, see JONATHAN BARRY 
FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK 76–77, 174–75, 186–90, 247–48 (2006). 
 85 This is a controversial assertion today with many commentators arguing that, in practice, 
FICA and self-employment taxes, borrowed by the federal Treasury, are simply used for general 
government purposes. See, e.g., John Sexton, CBO Says Social Security Disability Insurance 
Insolvent in Eight Years, VERUMSERUM.COM (Sept. 14, 2010, 9:35 AM), http://www.
verumserum.com/?p=17127 (“Now, I have elsewhere advocated that the ‘trust fund’ is a bogus 
way to look at the Social Security issue. I still believe that to be the case. In reality, current 
benefits like SSDI are coming from current workers. There really is no trust fund but the gen-
eral fund.”). 
 86 I.R.C. § 3101 (2006). 
 87 Id. § 3111 (West 2012). 
 88 For Federal Insurance Contributions Act, the formal name of the Code provisions estab-
lishing the Social Security taxes paid by employers and employees. I.R.C. §§ 3101–3128 (2006). 
 89 Id. § 3121(a) (West 2012). 
 90 Id. § 3121(b). 
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from the individual’s pay and remits to the federal government this 
withheld tax,91 along with an equal tax payment from the employer.92 
A self-employed person pays a Social Security tax mimicking the 
combined FICA payments of an employee and her employer.93 In par-
ticular, an individual who conducts a “trade or business”94 pays a Social 
Security tax on her “self-employment income.”95 The statutory rate of 
this self-employment tax equals the combined FICA rates paid by em-
ployers and employees.96 
There are extensive exemptions from the FICA and self-
employment taxes for persons who oppose on religious grounds insur-
ance programs like the Social Security system. These religious tax ex-
emptions raise the same First Amendment entanglement issues97 as the 
income tax exclusion for housing and housing allowances paid to “min-
ister[s] of the gospel.”98 
Section 1402(g) authorizes immunity from the federal self-
employment tax for “member[s] of a recognized religious sect” who, by 
reason of their adherence to the “established tenets or teachings of such 
sect,” are “conscientiously opposed to acceptance of the benefits of any 
private or public insurance.”99 This exemption was adopted by Congress 
in 1965100 and requires the member claiming exemption to apply for 
and prove his eligibility for the exemption. As part of the application 
process, the individual claiming this exemption from the self-
employment tax must waive his eligibility for Social Security benefits.101 
 
 91 Id. § 3102 (2006). 
 92 Labor economists generally agree that, for the long run, the economic incidence of the 
FICA taxes paid by employers falls in significant measure upon employees in the form of lower 
cash wages and less employment. See, e.g., RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MOD-
ERN LABOR ECONOMICS: THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 86–89 (7th ed. 2000) (“[A] comprehen-
sive review of these studies led to at least a tentative conclusion that most of a payroll tax is 
eventually shifted to wages . . . .”). 
 93 I.R.C. §§ 1401–1403 (West 2012). 
 94 Id. § 1402(a). 
 95 Id. § 1402(b). 
 96 Today, the tax rate on self-employed income equals 15.3% of which 12.4% is allocated to 
the Social Security program paying retirement, death and disability benefits and 2.9% is allocat-
ed to hospital coverage, conventionally known as Medicare. I.R.C. § 1401 (2006). For FICA 
purposes, the employer and employee each pay taxes on wages of 7.65% for a total of 15.3% of 
the employee’s wages. The employer and the employee each pay a FICA tax of 6.2% allocated to 
retirement, death and disability benefits and 1.45% for Medicare. I.R.C. §§ 3101, 3111 (West 
2012). 
 97 However, the subsidy analysis may be different because the tax relief generated by the 
religious exemptions of the FICA tax, the self-employment tax and the individual health care 
mandate are offset by a corresponding loss of Social Security benefits and of health care cover-
age. 
 98 I.R.C. § 107 (2006). 
 99 Id. § 1402(g) (West 2012). 
 100 Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 319(c), 79 Stat. 390, 391. 
 101 I.R.C. § 1402(g)(1)(B) (West 2012). 
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One of the religious exemptions from the new federal health insurance 
mandate incorporates Section 1402(g).102 
Section 1402(e) also excuses from the federal self-employment tax 
“a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a church or a 
member of a religious order” or “a Christian Science practitioner” if 
such minister, member or practitioner “is conscientiously opposed to, 
or because of religious principles []is opposed to, the acceptance . . . of 
any public insurance” and if he applies for recognition of his status as 
such an opponent of public insurance.103 Since they contribute no taxes 
to the Social Security system, ministers and members of orders who 
oppose “public insurance” on religious grounds do not earn Social Secu-
rity benefits.104 The regulations to which FFRF objects on entanglement 
grounds are in significant measure promulgated under Section 1402(e) 
and incorporated into Section 107 by reference.105 
For FICA tax purposes, the term “employment” excludes “service 
performed by a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a 
church in the exercise of his ministry.”106 In addition, the term “em-
ployment” for FICA purposes excludes services performed “by a mem-
ber of a religious order in the exercise of duties required by such order” 
unless the order elects Social Security coverage for its members.107 
As result of these statutory provisions, clergymen who are not op-
posed to Social Security pay self-employment tax since, as a statutory 
matter, they are not engaged in “employment” for FICA tax purposes 
but are instead deemed to be conducting a “trade or business” under the 
self-employment tax.108 For these clergymen, self-employment income 
includes any housing as well as cash parsonage allowances they re-
ceive.109 Clergymen religiously opposed to Social Security pay no FICA 
taxes because, as a statutory matter, they are not engaged in “employ-
ment”110 nor do they pay self-employment taxes because of the Section 
1402(e) exemption. 
 
 102 Id. § 5000A(d)(2)(A) (West 2012). 
 103 Id. § 1402(g) (West 2012). 
 104 42 U.S.C. § 411(c) (West 2012) provides that, for Social Security purposes, a minister or 
member of an order exempt from self-employment taxes under I.R.C. § 1402(e) (West 2012) 
does not conduct a “trade or business.” Consequently, such minister or member does not have 
“net earnings from self-employment” for the calculation of Social Security benefits and thus has 
no “average indexed monthly earnings” to generate Social Security benefits. 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 411(a), 415(a)–(b) (West 2012). 
 105 Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1(a) (as amended in 1963) (“In general, the rules provided in 
§ 1.1402(c)-5 will be applicable to such determination.”). 
 106 I.R.C. § 3121(b)(8)(A) (West 2012). 
 107 Id.; see also id. § 3121(r). 
 108 Id. § 1402(a)(8). 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. § 3121(b)(8)(A). 
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In the wake of United States v. Lee,111 discussed infra,112 Congress 
also exempted from FICA tax obligations employers and employees who 
satisfy the terms of Section 1402(g), i.e., those who are “member[s] of a 
recognized religious sect” who, by reason of their adherence to the “es-
tablished tenets or teachings of such sect,” are “conscientiously opposed 
to acceptance of the benefits of any private or public insurance.”113 Like 
the exemption from the self-employment tax under Section 1402(g), this 
exemption from FICA tax obligations requires the sect member assert-
ing the exemption to apply for and prove his eligibility.114 As part of the 
application process, the individual claiming this religious exemption 
from FICA taxation must waive his entitlement to Social Security bene-
fits.115 
A church or “church-controlled organization” which “is opposed 
for religious reasons to the payment of the” employer’s FICA tax obliga-
tion may elect for its employees’ earnings to be treated as 
nonemployment income for FICA purposes.116 As a result of this elec-
tion, such church employees are deemed for self-employment tax pur-
poses to be conducting a “trade or business”117 and thus owe self-
employment taxes on their earnings and accrue Social Security bene-
fits.118 
 
IV.     THE RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS OF THE FEDERAL HEALTH MANDATE 
 
Starting in 2014, PPACA and HCERA require most U.S. residents 
to carry “minimum essential” health care coverage for themselves and 
their dependents. This new individual health coverage mandate119 con-
tains two religious exemptions. One religious exemption from the new 
health mandate incorporates the self-employment tax exemption of 
Section 1402(g) to excuse from the health mandate sect members op-
posed to insurance on religious grounds.120 This sectarian exemption 
from the individual health coverage mandate is similar to a religious 
 
 111 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
 112 See infra notes 182–91 and accompanying text. 
 113 I.R.C. § 1402(g)(1) (West 2012). 
 114 Id. § 3127(b) (2006). 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. §§ 3121(b)(8)(B), 3121(w) (West 2012). 
 117 Id. § 1402(c)(2)(G). 
 118 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1026, 404.1068(f) (2012). 
 119 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1501(b), 
10106(b)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 244, 909 (2010) (codified at I.R.C. § 5000A (West 2012)); Health 
Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, §§ 1002, 1004, 124 Stat. 
1029, 1032, 1034 (same). For discussion of the individual mandate, see Zelinsky, supra note 7. 
 120 I.R.C. § 5000A(d)(2)(A) (West 2012). 
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exception under the Massachusetts state health law121 that pioneered the 
individual health insurance mandate. 
The federal health care mandate also exempts from its coverage any 
“member of a health care sharing ministry” if the members of such min-
istry “share a common set of ethical or religious beliefs and share medi-
cal expenses . . . in accordance with those beliefs.”122 
 
V.     WARREN AND THE FFRF COMPLAINT 
 
Warren v. Commissioner arose from the IRS’s insistence that a par-
sonage allowance was excludable from a minister’s gross income only up 
to an amount equal to the fair market rental value of the minister’s 
home. The annual fair market rental value of Rev. Warren’s home was 
approximately $58,000.123 Substantially more, approximately $85,000 
per year, was designated and paid to him as parsonage allowance and 
was actually spent on “mortgage, utilities, furnishings, landscaping, re-
pairs, and maintenance and real property taxes and homeowner’s insur-
ance premiums.”124 The U.S. Tax Court held that Rev. Warren’s entire 
parsonage allowance of $85,000 was excludable from his gross income. 
The IRS appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
contending, as it had in the Tax Court, that Rev. Warren125 could only 
exclude from his gross income $58,000 of his parsonage allowance, re-
flecting the fair rental value of Rev. Warren’s home. 
Circuit Judge Reinhardt ignited a political firestorm when he sua 
sponte questioned Section 107’s constitutionality: “[I]t is possible that 
any tax deduction that Rev. Warren receives under § 107(2) would con-
 
 121 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M, § 3 (2012) (exempting from the Massachusetts individual 
health care mandate Massachusetts residents with “sincerely held religious beliefs” against 
health insurance). See Edward A. Zelinsky, The New Massachusetts Health Law: Preemption 
and Experimentation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 229, 239 (2007). 
 122 I.R.C. § 5000A(d)(2)(B) (West 2012). 
 123 Warren v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 343, 344 (2000). Warren actually involved three different 
years in each of which somewhat different numbers were at stake. 
 124 Id. at 345. 
 125 Rev. Warren is a best-selling author, religious leader, and one of the ministers who led 
prayer at President Obama’s inauguration. Indeed, Rev. Warren has achieved the ultimate 
emblem of iconic status in American society: he has been quoted on Starbucks coffee cups. 
Peter Baker, Obama Takes Oath, and Nation in Crisis Embraces the Moment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
21, 2009, at A1; Damien Cave, How Breweth Java with Jesus, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2005, at D4; 
Daniel Eisenberg & Daren Fonda, People Who Mattered 2004, TIME MAG., Dec. 27, 2004, at 
116; Jonathan Mahler, The Soul of the New Exurb, N.Y. TIMES MAG., March 27, 2005, at 30, 50 
(“The modern master of church growth is Rick Warren.”). 
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stitute an unconstitutional windfall at the public’s expense.”126 The re-
sulting controversy engendered much commentary.127 
Congress responded by unanimously128 amending Section 107(2) 
to include prospectively the limit advocated by the IRS.129 As a result, 
Section 107(2) today restricts any minister’s parsonage allowance to “the 
fair rental value of the [minister’s] home.” Simultaneously, Congress 
declared that this rule did not apply retrospectively, i.e., did not apply in 
Warren.130 
This legislation terminated the Warren litigation by making the 
case moot. However, this termination came at a significant price, name-
ly, embedding into Section 107(2) the difficult-to-administer require-
ment that the church, the minister, and the IRS determine “the fair rent-
al value of the [minister’s] home.” 
In large measure, the FFRF complaint reprises the central theme 
advanced during the Warren litigation by the opponents of Section 107, 
namely, that Section 107 unconstitutionally subvents religion. The com-
plaint filed by FFRF asserts that Section 107 unconstitutionally “subsi-
dize(s), promote(s), endorse(s), favor(s), and advance(s) churches, reli-
gious organizations, and ‘ministers of the gospel.’”131 
 
 126 Warren v. Comm’r, 282 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 127 See, e.g., supra note 3; Ellen P. Aprill, Parsonage and Tax Policy: Rethinking the Exclusion, 
96 TAX NOTES 1243 (2002); Boyd Kimball Dyer, Redefining “Minister of the Gospel” to Limit 
Establishment Clause Issues, 95 TAX NOTES 1809 (2002); Eric Rakowski, Are Federal Income 
Tax Preferences for Ministers’ Housing Constitutional?, 95 TAX NOTES 775 (2002). 
 128 J. Christine Harris, President Signs Bill Clarifying Housing Allowance for Clergy, 95 TAX 
NOTES 1280 (2002). 
 129 Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-181, § 2(a), 116 
Stat. 583, 583. 
 130 Id. § 2(b). 
 131 Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 34.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona Christian 
School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011), suggests that the FFRF taxpayer-
plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their claims in the federal courts. In Winn, a five-justice 
majority held that Arizona taxpayers had no standing to mount an Establishment Clause chal-
lenge to state “tax credits for contributions to school tuition organizations, or STOs. STOs use 
these contributions to provide scholarships to students attending private schools, many of 
which are religious.” Id. at 1440. By denying taxpayers standing to challenge in the federal 
courts tax benefits in the form of tax credits, Winn indicates that the FFRF taxpayers also lack 
standing in the federal courts to challenge tax benefits in the form of the income tax exclusion 
provided by I.R.C. § 107 (2006). 
  However, as California taxpayers, the FFRF plaintiffs have strong claims to standing to 
challenge the parsonage allowance in the California courts. With minor modifications, CAL. 
REV. & TAX. CODE § 17131.6 (West 2012) incorporates I.R.C. § 107 and its parsonage allowance 
exclusion into the California income tax. The FFRF plaintiffs, as California taxpayers, have a 
robust claim to standing to challenge section 17131.6 in the California courts. Moreover, tax-
payers in other states have standing to contest their respective states’ parsonage allowances. 
Thus, even if the current litigation is dismissed for lack of standing in the federal courts, it is 
inevitable that equivalent litigation challenging the constitutionality of the parsonage allowance 
will be heard in one or more state courts. 
  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 526a (West 2012) authorizes actions to stop “any illegal ex-
penditure of waste of, or injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of a county, town, city or 
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However, in an important respect, the FFRF complaint goes be-
yond the subsidy argument advanced by the earlier opponents of Sec-
tion 107. Pressing beyond the claim of unconstitutional subvention, the 
FFRF also asserts that Section 107 causes “‘excessive entanglement’ be-
tween church and state” because “the IRS and the Treasury must make 
sensitive, fact-intensive, intrusive, and subjective determinations de-
pendent on religious criteria and inquiries” to enforce Section 107 and 
its exclusion from gross income.132 Supportive commentators bolster the 
FFRF’s argument that Section 107 contravenes the First Amendment 
because of the entanglement Section 107 causes between the IRS and the 
religious community.133 Part of the regulatory framework to which 
FFRF and these commentators object implements one of the religious 
exemptions from the self-employment tax134 and is incorporated under 
Section 107 by reference.135 
 
city and county.” Such actions may be maintained by citizens residing in the defendant munici-
pality or “by a corporation, who is assessed for and is liable to pay, or, within one year before 
the commencement of the action, has paid, a tax” in such municipality. Id. While the California 
statute on its face is limited to suits challenging municipal expenditures, the California courts 
have interpreted the statute to authorize “taxpayer action[s] . . . against the State.” Vasquez v. 
California, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 701, 703 (Ct. App. 2003) (“[T]he individual citizen must be able to 
take the initiative through taxpayers’ suits to keep government accountable on the state as well 
as on the local level.” (quoting Farley v. Cory, 144 Cal. Rptr. 923, 926 (Ct. App. 1978) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
  Another statutory basis for taxpayer standing in California is CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
§ 1086 (West 2012), which allows anyone who is “beneficially interested” to obtain a “writ of 
mandate” when “there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of 
law.” “The beneficial interest standard is so broad, even citizen or taxpayer standing may be 
sufficient to obtain relief in mandamus.” Doe v. Albany Unified Sch. Dist., 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
507, 520 (Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Mission Hosp. Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Shewry, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
639, 651 (Ct. App. 2009)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
  These statutes and the cases decided under them suggest that the FFRF has standing in 
the California courts to mount their Establishment Clause challenge to the parsonage allowance 
as incorporated into the Golden State’s income tax. 
  Most states have taxpayer standing rules more expansive than the federal rules. See, e.g., 
Britnell v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 374 So. 2d 282, 285 (1979) (“[A] plaintiff suing in his capacity 
as a citizen and taxpayer has standing to attack the constitutionality of expenditures.”). Given 
the liberal nature of most states’ taxpayer standing rules and the widespread incorporation of 
federal tax provisions into the states’ respective income tax laws, it is inevitable that the consti-
tutionality of the parsonage allowance will be litigated in one or more state courts. Thus, even if 
the FFRF litigation is terminated in the federal courts, the Establishment Clause challenge it 
raises to the parsonage allowance will recur in one or more state courts. 
 132 Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 35. 
 133 Robert Baty, Church Member Responds to Gompertz on Parsonage Case, 128 TAX NOTES 
226 (2010) (letter to editor); Michael L. Gompertz, Lawsuit Challenges Income Tax Preferences 
for Clergy, 128 TAX NOTES 81 (2010). 
 134 I.R.C. § 1402(e) (West 2012). 
 135 Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1(a) (as amended in 1963) (“In general, the rules provided in 
§ 1402(c)-5 will be applicable to such determination.”). 
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VI.     ENTANGLEMENT, SUBSIDIZATION, AND THE NORMATIVE TAX BASE 
 
Walz undermines the characterization of Section 107 as a tax sub-
sidy since it points to a plausible, nonsubsidizing rationale for Section 
107, i.e., a congressional decision to choose the problems of borderline 
entanglement rather than the costs of enforcement-related entangle-
ment. The characterization of any tax provision as a subsidy is only 
compelling if there is first established a normative baseline of taxation 
from which that provision is deemed to subsidize. Only with such a 
baseline established can the “subsidy” moniker be meaningfully applied 
to provisions that deviate from that baseline. Walz suggests that a nor-
mative income tax may properly contain an exclusion like Section 107 
to avoid enmeshing church and state in the inherently intrusive en-
forcement of the tax law. From this baseline, Section 107 is not a tax 
subsidy but, rather, is part of a normative tax. 
Professor Bittker cogently observed over a generation ago: “The as-
sertion that an exemption is equivalent to a subsidy is untrue, meaning-
less, or circular, depending on context, unless we can agree on a ‘correct’ 
or ‘ideal’ or ‘normal’ taxing structure as a benchmark for which to 
measure departures.”136 
Despite all of the ink which has subsequently been spilled on this 
topic,137 no one has ever refuted Professor Bittker’s insight that a tax 
exemption can only be convincingly labeled as a subsidy if there is prior 
agreement on the contours of a normative tax from which to measure 
subsidization. 
Consider, for example, the exclusion under the federal income tax 
of the income from self-performed services.138 Consider, in particular, 
the failure to tax the income my neighbor generates by growing his own 
tomatoes in his home garden. 
Those tomatoes constitute an “economic benefit”139 to my neigh-
bor. He could readily realize the cash value of that benefit by selling his 
tomatoes at the local farmers’ market at a not insignificant price. When 
he instead eats those tomatoes, my neighbor’s consumption constitutes 
 
 136 Boris I. Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285, 1304 (1969). 
 137 Much of the subsequent writing in this area has occurred under the heading of tax ex-
penditure analysis. See Edward D. Kleinbard, The Congress Within the Congress: How Tax 
Expenditures Distort Our Budget and Our Political Processes, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2010); 
Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of 
Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1168–70 (1993); Edward A. 
Zelinsky, Winn and the Inadvisability of Constitutionalizing Tax Expenditure Analysis, 121 
YALE L.J. ONLINE 25 (2011); Zelinsky, supra note 20, at 809–10. 
 138 See, e.g., MICHAEL A. LIVINGSTON & DAVID S. GAMAGE, TAXATION: LAW, PLANNING AND 
POLICY 126–27 (2d ed. 2010) (“[N]o one really expects the imputed income from goods or 
services to be taxed . . . .”). 
 139 United States v. Drescher, 179 F.2d 863, 865 (2d Cir. 1950). 
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income according to the widely accepted Haig-Simons definition of 
income.140 
The Internal Revenue Code confirms that “gross income means all 
income from whatever source derived”141—with no exception for home-
grown tomatoes. Similarly, the leading judicial definition of income—
“accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers 
have complete dominion”142—makes no exception for the tomatoes 
raised by my neighbor. 
Nevertheless, few, if any, think that my neighbor should report on 
his Form 1040 the value of his homegrown tomatoes or that the IRS 
should collect federal income tax on account of such tomatoes. Con-
cerns about valuation, taxpayer liquidity, public acceptability, and en-
forceability143 impel the conclusion that, notwithstanding the theoretical 
argument that homegrown tomatoes generate income, the Code’s defi-
nition of income should not be pressed that far. 
Does it make sense to characterize the failure to tax homegrown 
tomatoes as a tax subsidy? Professor Bittker’s insight indicates “no.” 
Income from self-performed services is excluded from the income tax 
base, not to subsidize such services, but because such exclusion is a 
proper feature of a baseline tax, considering such tax policy criteria as 
taxpayer liquidity, valuation, enforceability, and public acceptability. 
Only if a particular item is properly characterized as part of the norma-
tive income-tax base can its exclusion from that base be convincingly 
deemed a “subsidy.” 
Similarly, before Section 107 can be labeled as a tax “subsidy,” it is 
necessary to agree that a normative income tax should include the value 
of in-kind housing and cash housing allowances provided to “minis-
ter[s] of the gospel.” If Section 107 appropriately manages the enforce-
ment-related entanglement of church and state, then the exclusion from 
income of clerical housing and parsonage allowances, like the exclusion 
of self-performed services, is part of a normative baseline tax rather than 
a tax subsidy. 
In contrast, Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion in Texas Monthly 
declares that “[e]very tax exemption constitutes a subsidy”144 and that 
 
 140 The much-celebrated Haig-Simons definition of income includes as one of its compo-
nents “the market value of rights exercised in consumption.” This indicates that my neighbor 
has income when he eats his homegrown tomatoes. Indeed, the Haig-Simons definition sug-
gests that my neighbor has income as his tomatoes mature and thereby increase “the value of 
the store of property rights” represented by those tomatoes. HENRY SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME 
TAXATION 50 (1938). For discussion of the Haig-Simons definition of income, see WILLIAM A. 
KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 48–49 (15th ed. 2009). 
 141 I.R.C. § 61(a) (2006). 
 142 Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). 
 143 Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realization: Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism and the 
Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 861, 879 (1997). 
 144 Texas Monthly Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14 (1989). 
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any tax exemption aimed solely at religious entities and actors unconsti-
tutionally subvents religion. From these premises, Section 107, the reli-
gious exemptions from the individual health care mandate, and the sec-
tarian exemptions from the self-employment and FICA taxes all 
subsidize religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. 
 
VII.     REPEALING SECTION 107: SWAPPING BORDERLINE ENTANGLEMENT FOR 
ENFORCEMENT ENTANGLEMENT 
 
The contemporary opponents of Section 107 argue that Section 
107, rather than minimizing entanglement, itself enmeshes the federal 
tax collector and religious institutions. At first blush, these opponents 
marshal strong support for their concerns since policing the borders of 
Section 107’s income tax exclusion involves entangling concerns about 
eligibility for that exclusion. The FFRF complaint succinctly observes 
that, “to administer and apply” Code Section 107, the IRS and the 
Treasury must make sensitive, fact-intensive, intrusive, and subjective 
determinations dependent on religious criteria and inquiries, such as 
whether certain activities constitute “religious worship” or “sacerdotal 
functions”; whether a member of the clergy is “duly ordained, commis-
sioned, or licensed”; or whether a Christian college or other organiza-
tion is “under the authority of” a church or denomination. These and 
other determinations result in “excessive entanglement” between church 
and state contrary to the Establishment Clause.145 
This is in large measure a challenge, not to Section 107 itself, but to 
the Treasury regulations which implement it. The regulations are the 
source of such concepts as “religious worship,”146 “sacerdotal func-
tions,”147 and “duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed.”148 However, 
even if there were no regulations, defining “minister of the gospel” 
would, as a statutory matter, present the kind of borderline entangle-
ment concerns which troubled Justice Harlan and which were control-
ling for the Texas Monthly plurality, namely, the need to define who is 
and who is not such a minister. 
Thus, viewed in isolation, those who attack Section 107 on entan-
glement grounds mount a powerful case since difficult issues must be 
resolved to police the boundaries of that provision to determine who is 
eligible for that section’s income tax exclusion. However, for two rea-
 
 145 Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 35. 
 146 Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1(a) (as amended in 1963). 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. § 1.1402(c)-5(a)(2) (as amended in 1968); see also id. § 1.107-1(a) (as amended in 
1963) (“In general, the rules provided in § 1.1402(c)-5 will be applicable to such determina-
tion.”). 
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sons, Section 107 and its borderline enforcement quandaries cannot be 
viewed in isolation. First, if Section 107 is overturned by the courts (or 
repealed by Congress), much housing provided to clergymen will gener-
ate taxable income to them and thus will create problems of enforce-
ment entanglement as the IRS collects housing-related taxes from these 
clergymen and the churches for which they work. Second, as I discuss in 
the next Part, if Section 107 is stricken as unconstitutional, many reli-
gious institutions and clergy receiving employer-provided housing will 
default to the general provisions of Section 119.149 When this happens, 
the upshot will be the borderline entanglement problems of determining 
clerical employees’ eligibility for Section 119’s income tax exclusion for 
employer-furnished lodging. 
Consider first the possible invalidation of Section 107 as violating 
the First Amendment. This would cause the federal income taxation of 
many clergymen who receive currently nontaxable housing from their 
churches. Taxation is inherently intrusive. It inflicts compliance costs 
upon taxpayers and engenders conflict between taxpayers and the tax 
collector. If, for example, the rental value of church-provided housing 
must be included in a clergyman’s income, that value must be calculat-
ed, both so that the clergyman can report it on his Form 1040 and so 
that the employing church can withhold the appropriate income tax 
from the clergyman’s paychecks. Such rental values are not easily de-
termined and would be a source of conflict among the IRS, the religious 
institutions furnishing housing to their clerical employees, and the min-
isters receiving such employer-provided housing. To use Chief Justice 
Burger’s formulation from Lemon, the relationship between the tax col-
lector and the taxpayer constitutes “comprehensive, discriminating, and 
continuing state surveillance.”150 
If a church does not withhold the income tax attributable to the 
rental value of the lodging the church provides to its employees (or does 
not withhold enough), the IRS must then enforce the wage withholding 
statute151 against the church. Ultimately, this can result in liens152 on and 
levies against153 church property. Even short of this level of conflict, if 
Section 107 no longer excludes employer-provided housing from the 
income of clerical employees, the IRS would need to audit churches to 
confirm the accuracy of the amounts they report for their clerical em-
ployees as housing income as well as the adequacy of the church’s tax 
withholding from the wages it pays. 
 
 149 Indeed, Section 119 today governs the income tax status of housing provided by religious 
employers to those employees who do not qualify as “minister[s] of the gospel” for purposes of 
Section 107. 
 150 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971). 
 151 I.R.C. §§ 3401–3406 (2006). 
 152 Id. §§ 6320–6327. 
 153 Id. §§ 6330–6344 (West 2012). 
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The church-state entanglement that would arise from the taxation 
of noncash, housing-based income would be particularly acute in light 
of the potential valuation disputes among the IRS, religious employers, 
and clerical employees (e.g., What is the fair rental value of a church-
owned house?) and the fact that taxpayers receiving such noncash com-
pensation (e.g., clergymen living in church-owned housing) may be 
illiquid and thus not have the funds to pay tax on such noncash com-
pensation. Congress has plausibly decided that these valuation and li-
quidity problems, while acceptable for purposes of the self-employment 
tax,154 should be avoided in the context of the income tax. 
It is, in short, an illusion to believe that abolishing Section 107 
would eliminate church-state entanglement. By making church-
provided housing taxable, the invalidation of Section 107 would replace 
the borderline entanglement of that provision (determining who is eli-
gible for the exclusion) with enforcement entanglement (making sure 
the correct income tax is paid on clerical housing). In the taxation of the 
housing furnished to clergy, it was plausible for Congress to choose the 
quandaries of borderline entanglement over the prospect of enmeshing 
religious institutions and their clergy in the income taxation of such 
housing. In this setting, there is no disentangling alternative. 
 
VII.     SWAPPING ONE BORDERLINE ENTANGLEMENT FOR ANOTHER:  
SECTION 107 V. SECTION 119 
 
Moreover, if Section 107 were to be invalidated by the courts on 
First Amendment grounds, some (perhaps much) housing provided to 
clergymen would then be subject to Section 119 and its income tax ex-
clusion for employer-provided housing. The enforcement of Section 119 
entangles church and state at the borderlines as does Section 107. In 
particular, Section 119 and its general lodging exclusion to sectarian 
entities and individuals require four entangling inquiries to assess at the 
borderlines of Section 119 whether that provision applies. 
First, who is an “employee”? Section 119 and its exclusion for em-
ployer-provided housing only apply if the recipient of such housing is 
an “employee.” As Professor Dyer pointed out during the Warren litiga-
tion, some clergy are employees of their congregations, others are clear-
ly not, and yet others “fall anywhere within that broad range.”155 Deter-
mining whether any particular clergyman is an “employee” for purposes 
of Section 119 necessitates an entangling assessment of the religious 
doctrine and practice of the clergyman’s particular church. 
 
 154 Id. §§ 1402(a)(8). 
 155 Dyer, supra note 127, at 1811. 
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Second, is housing provided “for the convenience of the [religious] 
employer”? Assessing this requirement of Section 119 entails examina-
tion of the policies and practices of the religious institution furnishing 
housing to ascertain whether the institution provides such housing to its 
clerical employee “to enable him properly to perform the duties of his 
employment”156 or, rather, to compensate such employee. This, in turn, 
requires an intrusive inquiry into the purposes of those who govern the 
religious employer, including possible inquisition into their internal 
deliberations. 
Third, what is the particular church’s “business”? Section 119 only 
excludes the value of lodging employers provide on their respective 
“business premises.” This element of the statute necessitates a determi-
nation of the employing church’s “business” which, in turn, requires the 
IRS to assess the church’s policies and practices. Consider, for example, 
the members of a religious order who live at a homeless shelter they 
operate for their order. Is maintaining this shelter the order’s “business” 
for purposes of Section 119? 
Fourth, what are the church’s “premises”? Consider a rabbi ex-
pected to entertain his congregants on a regular basis at the home pro-
vided to him by the congregation and to hold study groups there. Is this 
home the “premises” of the congregation for purposes of Section 119? 
Thus, striking Section 107 under the First Amendment’s Estab-
lishment Clause would not end the entangling borderline inquiries the 
IRS must make of churches which provide housing to their ministers. 
Rather, striking Section 107 on constitutional grounds would shift the 
focus from the entangling borderline questions posed by Section 107 (Is 
a clergyman a “minister of the gospel”?) to the entangling borderline 
inquiries posed by Section 119 (Is a clergyman an employee? Is housing 
provided for his religious employer’s convenience? Is this housing part 
of the church’s “business premises”?). It is plausible for Congress to 
prefer as less intrusive and more easily administered the borderline en-
tanglement posed by Section 107 rather than the borderline entangle-
ment posed by Section 119. Consequently, Section 107 is properly part 
of a normative income tax rather than a subsidizing provision. 
Michael L. Gompertz disagrees. Calling on the courts to strike Sec-
tion 107 as unconstitutional, Mr. Gompertz argues that “there is usually 
no business need for the minister to live on church property,”157 that 
“the requirements of section 119 would almost never be met” by cler-
gymen,158 and that “it would not be difficult for the IRS to determine 
whether section 119 is applicable to a clergyman.”159 
 
 156 Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(b) (as amended in 1985). 
 157 Gompertz, supra note 133, § B.3, at 83. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
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In making these assessments, Mr. Gompertz sub silentio engages in 
the kind of entangling inquiries he criticizes in the context of Section 
107. To determine that “there is usually no business need for the minis-
ter to live on church property,” Mr. Gompertz must define the business 
of the church, must determine the needs of that business, and must de-
cide the contours of the church’s property. These inquiries under Sec-
tion 119 enmesh the church and the tax collector as much as the deter-
mination whether a clergyman is a “minister of the gospel” for purposes 
of Section 107. 
Confronted with these choices, Congress plausibly selected Section 
107 as its preferred method of managing entanglement between church 
and state in the context of housing provided to clergymen. To be sure, 
that choice is neither inevitable nor does it eliminate entanglement be-
tween the IRS and religious institutions since the Section 107 exclusion 
eliminates enforcement entanglement at the price of borderline entan-
glement. However, striking Section 107 would not eliminate entangle-
ment between church and state either. Rather, invalidating Section 107 
would, in some cases, replace entanglement at the borders of Section 
107 with the enforcement-related entanglement of church and state as 
the IRS would collect the income taxes attributable to clerical housing. 
In other instances, repealing Section 107 would shift the enmeshing 
inquiries about eligibility for exemption from the entangling inquiries 
posed at the boundaries of Section 107 to the similarly entangling ques-
tions which mark the boundaries of Section 119. 
 
VIII.     A BROADER POSSIBILITY: NEITHER SECTION 107 NOR SECTION 119 
APPLIES TO RELIGIOUS EMPLOYERS 
 
This analysis raises another, broader possibility, namely, that the 
Establishment Clause forbids both Section 107 and the application of 
Section 119 to churches and their personnel. At first blush, such an ex-
pansive construction of the First Amendment promises to eliminate 
both the entangling inquiries necessary to enforce the borders of Section 
107 and the entangling inquiries needed to police eligibility for Section 
119 since, under this alternative, neither provision could apply to reli-
gious employers or their personnel. 
For three reasons, this approach is ultimately unsatisfactory. First, 
troubling Free Exercise160 concerns arise if Section 119 is construed as 
available to all employers except religious institutions. “[T]he protec-
tions of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates 
 
 160 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof . . . .”). 
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against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct 
because it is undertaken for religious reasons.”161 Such discrimination 
would occur in violation of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise clause 
if Section 119 is interpreted as benefiting all employers other than reli-
gious entities. 
Second, if, in a world without Section 107, the courts also declare 
that Section 119 cannot apply to religious institutions and their employ-
ees or if Congress legislates to that effect, it will then be necessary to 
determine which institutions and employees fall within this Section 119 
ban by virtue of their sectarian nature and which do not. Again, entan-
gling borderline inquires would arise if the IRS were required to deter-
mine which employers are religious (and thus outside the purview of 
Section 119) and which are secular (and thus covered by that provision). 
The prospect of eliminating church-state entanglement again proves 
illusory. 
Third, if neither Section 107 nor Section 119 precludes the income 
taxation of the value of housing provided to clergy, then the IRS, to en-
force that taxation, would be required to intrude into internal church 
autonomy to ensure that ministers include in their gross incomes the 
value of the housing provided to them. The upshot would be the kind of 
enforcement entanglement against which Chief Justice Burger cautioned 
in Walz and Lemon, i.e., continuing government intervention into in-
ternal church operations. As noted above, taxation—particularly the 
taxation of hard-to-value, illiquid income provided in in-kind—is in-
herently intrusive. 
Thus, at the end of the day, the search for disentangling tax alterna-
tives is unavailing, both in the context of the general relationship be-
tween the modern state’s tax system and contemporary religious entities 
and, more specifically, in the context of the tax treatment of clerical 
housing. When taxes and churches collide, there are no disentangling 
alternatives, only imperfect trade-offs between different forms of entan-
glement. If the current regulations under Section 107 are jettisoned, it 
will then be necessary to decide at the borders of Section 107 who is a 
“minister of the gospel” for purposes of that provision and who is not. If 
Section 107 itself is stricken as violating the First Amendment’s Estab-
lishment Clause, similar borderline issues will arise in determining if 
Section 119 applies to church-provided housing. Were clerical housing 
to be taxed as income, the enforcement of the Code against churches 
and their employees would produce the enforcement entanglement in-
herent in the relationship between the tax collector and taxpayers and 
would thus impair the autonomy of religious entities by intruding the 
IRS into their internal operations. If neither Section 119 nor Section 107 
 
 161 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993). 
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excluded from clerical incomes the rental value of employer-provided 
housing, there would be both enforcement entanglement (as the IRS 
taxes housing provided in-kind to clergy) and borderline entanglement 
(to determine which employers are secular and therefore remain cov-
ered by Section 119 and its income tax exclusion). 
There is no obvious metric to determine which of these alternatives 
is more or less entangling than the others. However, the two factors 
cited by Chief Justice Burger in Lemon reinforce the conclusion that 
Section 107 is a plausible pick from among the imperfect choices availa-
ble. First, like the property tax exemption upheld in Walz, Section 107’s 
exclusion for in-kind housing and cash parsonage allowances is a long-
established provision of the Code. What is now Section 107(1) was add-
ed to the Internal Revenue Code in 1921.162 Section 107(2) was enacted 
in 1954.163 While there is no precise yardstick to determine when laws 
are old enough to merit Lemon’s history-based presumption of constitu-
tionality, Section 107 is not a recent addition to the federal tax statute. 
Moreover, unlike the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania laws which 
required annual appropriations from those states’ respective legislatures, 
Section 107 is a classic tax provision, embedded into a permanent tax 
code.164 There is accordingly less formal165 opportunity for religiously-
divisive legislative battles over Section 107 than there is with a prototyp-
ical spending program, dependent on annual appropriations. 
Reinforcing these Lemon factors is the reality that taxing noncash 
income (like clerical housing) is particularly intrusive as the IRS and 
taxpayers dispute the value of such in-kind income and as the taxpayers 
receiving such noncash income must find cash from other sources to 
discharge their tax liabilities. 
In short, Section 107 is a constitutionally permissible means of 
managing the entanglement problems inherent in the income tax treat-
ment of housing provided to “minister[s] of the gospel.” In the modern 
tax setting, there is no easy way to disentangle mega-churches from 
mega-governments. Section 107 is a plausible, though not an obligatory, 
choice from among the imperfect alternatives available. In a world of 
trade-offs, Section 107 embodies the constitutionally permissible ac-
ceptance of the problems of policing the borderlines of a tax exemption 
 
 162 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 213(b)(11), 42 Stat. 227, 239. 
 163 Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 32. 
 164 Zelinsky, supra note 21, at 400–03. 
 165 In practice legislatures tend to make budgeting changes at the margins, using the prior 
year’s spending as an accepted baseline. The classic statement of budgetary incrementalism is 
found in AARON WILDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 13 (1964) (“Budget-
ing is incremental. The largest determining factor of the size and content of this year’s budget is 
last year’s budget. Most of the budget is a product of previous decisions.” (emphasis omitted)). 
For Professor Wildavsky’s later comments on budgetary incrementalism, see AARON 
WILDAVSKY, THE NEW POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 405 (1988). 
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rather than embracing the enforcement entanglement inherent in taxing 
the housing churches provide to their ministers. 
To the contrary is Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion in Texas 
Monthly. For Justice Brennan, any tax exemption restricted to religious 
institutions or actors is a subsidy that contravenes the Establishment 
Clause. From this vantage, Section 107 is an unconstitutional subven-
tion targeted exclusively at religion. 
In conventional terms, Justice Brennan’s Texas Monthly opinion is 
of no precedential force since only three justices adhered to it. Rather, in 
conventional terms, Justice Blackmun’s Texas Monthly concurrence 
controls as “the narrowest grounds” advanced for the majority’s deci-
sion in Texas Monthly.166 Justice Blackmun carefully described his con-
currence as a “narrow resolution” of the case, focused on the availability 
of the challenged sales tax exemption “exclusively to the sale of religious 
publications.”167 From this limited holding, Texas Monthly is restricted 
to cases involving religious publications and thus has no relevance to 
Section 107 and its exclusion of clerical housing and parsonage allow-
ances. 
For two reasons, Justice Brennan’s Texas Monthly opinion should 
not be dismissed in this fashion. First, Chief Justice Burger’s Walz opin-
ion, while permitting New York to exempt religious property from taxa-
tion to avoid entangling church and state, also places New York’s ex-
emption for religious property in the context of simultaneous 
exemption for a wide range of charitable, eleemosynary, and educational 
properties. We do not know if Chief Justice Burger’s five concurring 
colleagues would have joined his Walz opinion without reference to that 
broader context. 
Second, in Texas Monthly, the dissent and the plurality opinion 
each garnered the same support. Three justices read Chief Justice Burg-
er’s majority opinion in Walz as permitting exclusively religious tax 
exemptions to avoid church-state entanglement while three justices 
adhered to Justice Brennan’s reading of Walz as approving religious tax 
exemptions only as part of broad exemptions including other charitable 
and secular eleemosynary institutions. 
The problem with the Texas Monthly plurality opinion is its con-
tention that, by eliminating the Texas sales tax exemption for religious 
publications, the Court abolished entanglement between church and 
state. Not so. Texas Monthly merely shifted church-state entanglement 
 
 166 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court decides a 
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding 
of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments of the narrowest grounds.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United 
States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 523 (2008) (“Since his vote is necessary to our judgment, and 
since his opinion rests upon the narrower ground, the Court’s holding is limited accordingly.”). 
 167 Texas Monthly Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 28 (1997). 
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from the eligibility determinations at the borders of the sales tax exemp-
tion to enforcement entanglement as the state collected tax from reli-
gious publications. There is no obvious metric for ranking which of 
these alternatives enmeshes the tax collector and religious institutions 
least. This suggests that the choice is properly a legislative, rather than 
judicial, task. Thus, in the final analysis, Section 107 is saved from First 
Amendment challenge by Walz and Walz’s approval of religious tax 
exemptions as permitted means of managing entanglement between 
church and state, a plausible choice given that no disentangling alterna-
tive exists. 
 
IX.     SECTION 107(2) AS A MATTER OF TAX POLICY 
 
That Section 107 is constitutional does not mean that Section 107 is 
compelling as a matter of tax policy. In terms of tax policy, there is no 
persuasive case for Section 107(2) and its exclusion of cash parsonage 
allowances. In First Amendment terms, taxing cash income is less en-
tangling than taxing in-kind compensation holding all else equal since, 
when taxing cash, there are no valuation issues and the taxpayer has the 
liquidity to pay the tax. 
The normative168 arguments for excluding in-kind fringe benefits 
from employees’ gross incomes depend upon such tax policy criteria as 
valuation, liquidity, enforcement, and public acceptability.169 Valuing 
in-kind benefits is often difficult. When a benefit is provided in-kind, 
the benefit itself generates no cash for the employee to pay the tax which 
would result from including the benefit in the employee’s gross income. 
In light of these valuation and liquidity concerns, it may be difficult for 
the IRS to enforce the income taxation of in-kind benefits. The taxation 
of noncash income is poorly understood by taxpayers and often resent-
ed by them. The public acceptability of any particular tax provision is an 
important consideration in a democracy whose tax system requires tax-
payers to self-report their respective incomes. From a First Amendment 
perspective, taxing cash compensation (like the parsonage allowance) 
enmeshes the taxpayer and the tax collector less than does the taxation 
of otherwise equivalent in-kind income. 
While these considerations underpin the normative argument for 
excluding from employees’ gross incomes the value of employer-
provided housing furnished in-kind, these considerations do not justify 
 
 168 On the distinction between normative income tax provisions, designed to implement the 
proper tax base, and subsidizing provisions, intended to encourage particular activities, see 
Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. 
L. REV. 973, 978 (1986). 
 169 Zelinsky, supra note 143. 
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Section 107(2) and its exclusion from gross income of cash parsonage 
allowances. Such allowances raise neither valuation nor liquidity issues 
since the ministers receiving such allowances are paid in cash and can 
defray their tax liabilities (or have their liabilities withheld) from such 
cash. It is easier for the IRS to enforce the taxation of cash income than 
in-kind income. Taxing parsonage allowances would not offend the 
popular intuition equating income with cash since such allowances take 
the form of cash. 
The historic justification for Section 107(2) was to establish tax 
parity between ministers receiving tax-free housing in-kind and minis-
ters receiving cash parsonage allowances.170 Since the former pay no 
income tax on the lodging provided to them in kind, Congress decided 
in 1954 that the latter should not report as gross income the housing 
provided to them in the form of cash allowances. 
However, the Code does not create equivalent tax parity between 
an employee who is provided tax-free housing by his employer under 
Section 119 and an otherwise similar employee who is paid cash com-
pensation and must purchase his own residential accommodations with 
after-tax dollars. There is no compelling argument for establishing tax 
parity among those ministers who receive in-kind housing and those 
who receive cash housing allowances as the Code creates no similar par-
ity for nonclerical employees receiving taxable cash and nontaxable em-
ployer-provided lodging. 
The best retort is that repealing Section 107(2) and its income tax 
exclusion for parsonage allowances will cause churches to furnish to 
their clergy tax-free in-kind lodging rather than taxable cash allowances. 
If Congress repeals Section 107(2), the argument goes, a church previ-
ously paying a parsonage allowance to a minister to rent his home 
could, after such repeal, pay the rent itself and then provide the rented 
home to the minister in-kind and income tax-free. 
Such behavior is likely to occur at the margins if Congress repeals 
Section 107(2). By the same token, at the margins, there are some em-
ployers which today provide housing to afford their employees the Sec-
tion 119 exclusion and which would not provide that housing if Section 
119 were repealed. As long as some in-kind fringe benefits are tax-
favored, employers will have an incentive to offer such benefits to their 
workers in lieu of cash compensation. 
Ironically, the amendment to Section 107(2) that Congress adopted 
in 2002 during Warren to strengthen the case for Section 107(2) had the 
opposite effect. The 2002 amendment makes Section 107(2) less persua-
sive as a matter of tax policy by requiring the determination of “the fair 
 
 170 H. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 4040 (1954) (“Your committee has removed the discrimination 
in existing law by providing that the present exclusion is to apply to rental allowances paid to 
ministers to the extent used by them to rent or provide a home.”). 
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rental value” of the minister’s home. This limit, now embodied in the 
statute, increases the compliance costs of the church and the minister 
who must ascertain this limit annually. This limit also compounds the 
enforcement burden of the IRS, which, on audit, must ascertain this 
limit as well. From the perspective of normative tax criteria, this in-
crease in taxpayer compliance costs and the IRS’s enforcement burden 
was an unfavorable development. 
Important voices call for the amendment of Section 107(2) to place 
a dollar cap on that section’s exclusion or to limit the parsonage allow-
ance exclusion to one residence per minister.171 Whatever the merits of 
those proposed reforms, they do not address the underlying 
unpersuasiveness of the parsonage allowance exclusion as a matter of 
tax policy. 
In short, the current exclusion from clerical gross incomes of par-
sonage allowances is a constitutionally permitted choice, given the 
trade-offs and imperfect alternatives in this area, but is not constitution-
ally compelled. As a matter of tax policy, Section 107(2) is inadvisable 
since parsonage allowances, paid and received in cash, pose neither val-
uation nor liquidity challenges for taxpayers or the tax system.172 
 
X.     THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS  
FROM THE SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES AND THE  
INDIVIDUAL HEALTH CARE MANDATE 
 
The constitutional controversy surrounding Section 107 has broad 
implications. If Section 107 unconstitutionally entangles church and 
state, so too do the two religious exemptions from the new federal indi-
vidual health care mandate as do the religious exemptions from the self-
employment and FICA taxes. By the same token, if Section 107 is consti-
tutionally permissible in light of the trade-off between borderline entan-
glement and enforcement entanglement, so too these other exemptions 
are imperfect but constitutionally acceptable choices. The latter is the 
more compelling conclusion given the absence of disentangling alterna-
tives. 
Consider first the entangling borderline inquiries required by Sec-
tion 1402(g) and its sectarian exemption from the self-employment tax. 
Section 1402(g) applies if an individual is “conscientiously opposed” to 
 
 171 See Grassley Staff Memo, supra note 14. at 10–15; ECFA, supra note 15; see also Driscoll 
v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 557 (2010), rev’d, No. 11-12454, 2012 WL 384834 (11th Cir. Feb. 8, 2012). 
 172 Even if cash parsonage allowances were included in clergymen’s gross incomes, clergy 
earning modest compensation would pay little or no federal income tax as a result of the stand-
ard deduction, personal exemptions and earned income credit. I.R.C. §§ 32, 63(c), 151 (West 
2012). 
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insurance. To so qualify, an individual must be a “member of a recog-
nized religious sect.” The determination whether this threshold eligibil-
ity standard is met requires three borderline inquiries enmeshing the 
IRS and the individual claiming this exemption: that individual’s mem-
bership status in a “sect,” the “religious” nature of the “sect” of which he 
is a member, and the “recognized” status of that religious sect. Once this 
threshold is crossed, eligibility for exemption under Section 1402(g) 
further requires examination of the “established tenets or teachings of 
such sect” as well a determination that the individual asserting exemp-
tion is “conscientiously opposed to acceptance of the benefits of any 
private or public insurance.” 
Viewed in isolation, these inquiries (like the entangling borderline 
questions raised by Section 107) enmesh along religious lines the IRS 
and the individual claiming exemption from the self-employment tax 
under Section 1402(g). However, at the second step of the analysis, the 
dilemma of entanglement in the modern era recurs: If Section 1402(g)’s 
religious exemption is stricken on First Amendment grounds or is re-
pealed by Congress, the entangling borderline inquiries required to de-
termine eligibility under Section 1402(g) would disappear, but would be 
replaced by governmental intrusions into religious individuals’ personal 
autonomy as the IRS enforces the self-employment tax against such 
individuals. If the self-employment tax applies to an individual, the IRS 
must audit to assess his compliance with that tax. The audit process is 
inherently intrusive. If the IRS finds that an individual fails to pay the 
self-employment tax, the IRS is obligated to collect the tax from this 
individual and possibly to assess fines against such individual. If (absent 
Section 1402(g)) an individual declines to pay the tax and fines as a mat-
ter of religious scruple, the IRS would be required to take enforcement 
action against this individual’s income and assets to collect a tax that 
violates this individual’s religious beliefs. 
Thus, if Section 1402(g) were to be declared unconstitutional or 
were to be repealed by Congress for purposes of the self-employment 
tax, the IRS’s focus would, in the context of those religiously opposed to 
Social Security, shift from the borderline inquiries raised by the Section 
1402(g) exemption (e.g., Is an individual a “member of a recognized 
religious sect”?) to the intrusions into personal autonomy that are in-
herent in enforcing any tax. Borderline entanglement will have been 
traded for enforcement entanglement. 
Similar observations about Section 1402(g) apply in the context of 
the individual health care mandate that incorporates that section. Polic-
ing eligibility for this sectarian exemption from the new federal mandate 
will require entangling inquiries to determine whether an individual 
claiming the exemption, as a “member” of a “recognized religious sect,” 
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qualifies for the exemption.173 Absent this exemption and its borderline 
entanglements, there will be church-state conflict in forcing individuals 
who are religiously opposed to health insurance to carry such insurance. 
If, as FFRF maintains, for Establishment Clause purposes, Section 107 
requires excessive entanglement between church and state, so too this 
religious exemption from the new federal health care mandate violates 
the Establishment Clause insofar as that exemption incorporates Section 
1402(g). For First Amendment purposes, the questions which must be 
determined to assess an individual’s eligibility for mandate exemption 
via Section 1402(g) are indistinguishable from the inquiries under Sec-
tion 107 to which FFRF objects. 
However, nullifying this mandate exemption would not eliminate 
religious entanglement between the IRS and individuals who reject 
health insurance on sectarian grounds. Rather, repealing this exemption 
would transform the nature of such entanglement from the enmeshing 
borderline inquiries necessary to determine eligibility for mandate ex-
emption under Section 1402(g) to the intrusions necessary to enforce 
the health care mandate against those religiously opposed to it. 
In short, if Section 107 unconstitutionally entangles the IRS with 
religious entities and actors in violation of the First Amendment, so too 
does Section 1402(g), which requires similar determinations of religious 
practice and belief to ascertain if that section applies. More convincing-
ly, Section 1402(g) (both for the self-employment tax and the health care 
mandate) embodies a constitutionally reasonable acceptance of the bor-
derline entanglements of eligibility determination over enforcement 
entanglements. Given the inevitable trade-offs in these areas, it is consti-
tutional to permit (but not require) Congress to pick between the prob-
lems of enforcement entanglement and the difficulties of borderline 
entanglement. There is, again, no disentangling alternative. 
Similar observations pertain to Section 1402(e)’s exemption from 
the self-employment tax. Section 1402(e), it will be recalled, exempts 
from this tax “a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a 
church or a member of a religious order” or “a Christian Science practi-
tioner” if such minister, member or practitioner “is conscientiously op-
posed to, or because of religious principles []is opposed to, the ac-
ceptance . . . of any public insurance.” The IRS and those claiming 
eligibility for this exemption are enmeshed in such boundary-defining 
questions as the claimants’ ministerial status and the “religious princi-
ples” to which such claimants adhere. Without this exemption in the 
Code, the IRS would be required to enforce the self-employment tax 
against individuals despite their religious opposition to “public insur-
 
 173 Id. § 5000A(d)(2) (West 2012) (incorporating I.R.C. § 1402(g) (West 2012)). 
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ance” such as the Social Security system financed by the self-
employment tax. 
Two of the regulatory provisions explicitly challenged by the FFRF 
in its complaint as excessively entangling are provisions which imple-
ment the 1402(e) exemption from the self-employment tax. Specifically, 
FFRF brands as unconstitutional in the context of Section 107 the need 
for the IRS to determine “whether a member of the clergy is ‘duly or-
dained, commissioned, or licensed’”174 as well as the need to ascertain 
“whether a Christian college or other organization is ‘under the authori-
ty of’ a church or denomination.”175 
The first of these tests (“duly ordained, commissioned, or li-
censed”) comes from Section 1402(e) itself and is repeated in the regula-
tions implementing that section.176 The second of these tests (“under the 
authority”) comes from the regulations implementing the Section 
1402(e) exemption from the self-employment tax.177 Both of these tests 
are incorporated by reference into the regulations under Section 107.178 
If, as FFRF contends, these tests unconstitutionally entangle church and 
state in the context of Section 107, they also unconstitutionally entangle 
in the context of Section 1402(e), the Code provision under which these 
tests are directly promulgated. By the same token, if these borderline 
tests are reasonable choices in the context of Section 1402(e) (as I con-
clude they are), these tests are equally reasonable choices in the context 
of Section 107 as, by these tests, Congress opts for the problems of bor-
derline entanglement over enforcement entanglement. 
Consider as well the other exemption from the new federal health 
insurance mandate for members of a “health care sharing ministry.”179 
Under this exemption, a member of such a ministry need not carry 
“minimum essential coverage” if the members of such ministry “share a 
common set of ethical or religious beliefs and share medical expens-
es . . . in accordance with those beliefs.”180 Paradoxically, this exemption 
from the new individual health care mandate is both less and more sus-
ceptible to constitutional challenge than is the mandate exemption 
which incorporates Section 1402(g). 
On the one hand, the health care ministry exemption applies, not 
just to ministries based on “religious beliefs,” but also to health care 
ministries bottomed on “ethical,” presumably secular, “beliefs.” Thus, 
this exemption looks less like the narrow Texas sales tax exemption, 
 
 174 Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 35. 
 175 Id. at 6–7. 
 176 Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(c)-5(a)(2) (as amended in 1968). 
 177 Id. § 1.1402(c)-5(b)(2) (as amended in 1968). 
 178 Id. § 1.107-1(a) (as amended in 1963) (“In general, the rules provided in § 1.1402(c)-5 
will be applicable to such determination.”). 
 179 I.R.C. § 5000A(d)(2)(B) (West 2012). 
 180 Id. 
Zelinsky.33-4 (Do Not Delete) 3/25/2012 3:35 PM 
2012] RE LIG IO U S  T AX E X E MPT IO N S  1671 
restricted to religious publications and stricken in Texas Monthly, and 
resembles more the broader New York property tax exemption, availa-
ble to certain secular properties and upheld in Walz. 
On the other hand, the health care ministry exemption from the 
federal coverage mandate is a totally new innovation to the Internal 
Revenue Code and thus lacks the Lemon-based presumption of history. 
The other religious exemption from the federal health care mandate 
incorporates Section 1402(g), which was added to the Code in 1965.181 
Since Section 1402(g) has been part of the federal tax law for almost half 
a century, it is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality by virtue of 
its age. That history-based presumption should also apply to the health 
mandate exemption incorporating Section 1402(g). The mandate ex-
emption based on Section 1402(g) is an incremental extension of prior 
law that acknowledges that, just as those religiously opposed to insur-
ance are not to be required to pay the self-employment tax financing 
Social Security, they should not be required to comply with the new 
federal obligation to carry health insurance. 
In contrast, the other mandate exemption for members of qualify-
ing health care ministries makes no reference to Section 1402(g) or any 
other prior law. Like the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes invali-
dated in Lemon, this mandate exemption is a totally new enactment that 
enjoys no history-based presumption of constitutionality. 
Hence, the broader implications of the FFRF’s constitutional chal-
lenge to Section 107(2) and the parsonage allowance established by that 
section: If the FFRF is correct that that tax exclusion violates the First 
Amendment by impermissibly entangling the IRS and religious institu-
tions and personnel, so too the First Amendment proscribes the reli-
gious exemptions of the FICA and self-employment taxes as well as the 
religious exemptions of the new federal health insurance mandate. 
I conclude otherwise. Given the inherent trade-offs between bor-
derline entanglement and enforcement entanglement, these religious tax 
exemptions are permissible responses to the inexorable problems of 
church-state entanglement under modern tax systems. However, these 
exemptions are not constitutionally required. Congress can constitu-
tionally opt for the problems of enforcement entanglement by eschew-
ing these kinds of exemptions. 
Instructive on this point is Lee.182 Mr. Lee, a member of the Old 
Order Amish religion, employed other members of his faith to work on 
his farm and in his carpentry shop.183 He did not pay the FICA tax184 
 
 181 Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 319(c), 79 Stat. 390, 391. 
 182 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
 183 Id. at 254. 
 184 Id.; see also I.R.C. § 3101 (2006). 
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imposed on employers nor did he withhold the FICA tax185 employers 
are required to retain from their employees’ wages. Mr. Lee’s noncom-
pliance with the FICA tax stemmed from his religious beliefs forbidding 
participation in and the financing of public insurance like Social Securi-
ty.186 
Ruling against Mr. Lee, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the fed-
eral “Government’s interest in assuring mandatory and continuous par-
ticipation in and contribution to the social security system is very 
high.”187 That interest, the Lee Court concluded, outweighed Mr. Lee’s 
offsetting interest in protecting his religious beliefs: “Because the broad 
public interest in maintaining a sound tax system is of such a high or-
der, religious belief in conflict with the payment of taxes affords no basis 
for resisting the tax.”188 
If Mr. Lee had no employees, he would have qualified for Section 
1402(g) and its exemption from the self-employment tax. Section 
1402(g) is a congressional “effort toward accommodation”189 that plau-
sibly “drew a line”190 between, on the one hand, employers who reli-
giously oppose Social Security but must pay FICA tax and, on the other 
hand, self-employed persons who reject Social Security on religious 
ground and are consequently excused from paying the self-employment 
tax. Lee, written by Chief Justice Burger for himself and seven of his 
colleagues,191 follows the trail of permissive accommodation marked by 
Walz. In cases like Mr. Lee’s, Congress elected not to accommodate. In 
the framework of this Article, Congress elected in Mr. Lee’s case for the 
problems of enforcement entanglement—making Mr. Lee pay FICA tax 
for himself and his employees despite their religious objections to Social 
Security—rather than the quandaries of borderline entanglement. 
Subsequent to Lee, Congress reversed this choice and enacted the 
religious exemption of Section 3127192 to overturn Lee. Section 3127 
now exempts from FICA taxation employers and employees described 
in Section 1402(g), i.e., employers and employees who are “member[s] 
of a recognized religious sect” who, by reason of their adherence to the 
“established tenets or teachings of such sect,” are “conscientiously op-
posed to acceptance of the benefits of any private or public insur-
 
 185 Lee, 455 U.S. at 254; see also I.R.C. § 3111 (West 2012). 
 186 Lee, 455 U.S. at 257. 
 187 Id. at 258–59. 
 188 Id. at 260. In Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 880 (1990), the Court cited Lee 
for the proposition that the First Amendment does not require exemption from “a neutral, 
generally applicable regulatory law that compel[s] activity forbidden by an individual’s reli-
gion.” 
 189 Lee, 455 U.S. at 261 n.11. 
 190 Id. at 261. 
 191 Justice Stevens concurred in a separate opinion. Id. at 261. 
 192 I.R.C. § 3127 (West 2012). 
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ance.”193 The constitutional status of Section 3127, like the constitution-
al status of the federal health mandate exemption incorporating Section 
1402(g), depends upon the constitutional status of Section 1402(g) itself. 
If Section 1402(g) entails excessive religious entanglement in violation 
of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, so too does Sec-
tion 3127, which incorporates Section 1402(g). If, on the other hand, 
Section 1402(g) is, as I contend, a constitutionally permissible approach 
given the absence of disentangling alternatives when a modern tax sys-
tem interacts with the contemporary religious community, Section 3127 
similarly survives First Amendment scrutiny. 
Section 3127 covers situations where both an employer and her 
employees object on religious grounds to Social Security. Section 
3121(b)(8)(B),194 in contrast, applies when a sectarian employer objects 
to the payment of FICA taxes but the employees do not share those ob-
jections. Consequently, the employees are treated as though they are 
self-employed and pay the federal self-employment tax while the em-
ployer is excused from paying the FICA taxes it would otherwise owe. 
Section 3121(b)(8)(B) raises one more time the inexorable choice 
between borderline entanglement and enforcement entanglement. To be 
eligible for FICA tax exemption under Section 3121(b)(8)(B), an em-
ployer must be a church or “church-controlled organization” that “is 
opposed for religious reasons to the payment of the” employer FICA 
tax. Determining qualification for this exemption enmeshes church and 
state in religiously sensitive inquiries at the boundaries of exemption: Is 
a particular employer a church or “church-controlled”? Is the church’s 
opposition to FICA taxation “for religious reasons”? 
However, repealing Section 3121(b)(8)(B) would entangle church 
and state as well. Absent Section 3121(b)(8)(B), the IRS must enforce 
FICA taxation against churches doctrinally opposed to such taxation. 
Again, the choice Congress confronts is between imperfect alternatives, 
i.e., the enmeshment of church and state in determining qualification 
for exemption or the entanglement of church and state as the IRS en-
forces FICA taxation against churches opposed to such taxation. In First 
Amendment terms, Section 3121(b)(8)(B), like the other exemptions of 
the FICA and self-employment taxes, is a reasonable, though not a 
compelled, choice to incur the difficulties of patrolling the borders of 
sectarian tax exemption rather than incur the costs of enforcing taxation 
against those religiously opposed to it. 
 
 193 Id. § 1402(g). 
 194 Id. § 3121(b)(8)(B). 
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XI.     A FINAL WORD ON LEMON AND HOSANNA-TABOR 
 
Among the important contemporary First Amendment controver-
sies is the status of what Justice Kennedy labeled “the so-called Lemon 
test.”195 Justice Scalia, in a memorable attack on Lemon, observed that 
“[t]he secret of the Lemon test’s survival, I think, is that it is so easy to 
kill. It is there to scare us (and our audience) when we wish it to do so, 
but we can command it to return to the tomb at will.”196 Other voices 
take a different tack including my Cardozo colleague Marci Hamilton.197 
My take on this debate will, at this point, not surprise the reader: 
Entanglement, one of the three Lemon factors, is not a useful criterion in 
the tax context as there are no disentangling alternatives in that context. 
Whatever the value in other settings of entanglement as an element of 
First Amendment decision-making, entanglement provides no purchase 
in evaluating tax exemptions for religious actors and institutions. The 
invariable choices under a modern tax system are to tax sectarian actors 
and institutions and thereby incur the problems of enforcement entan-
glement or to exempt such actors and institutions and thereby incur the 
quandaries of borderline entanglement. 
Though it is not a tax case, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC198 
graphically illustrates the trade-off between enforcement entanglement 
and borderline entanglement. 
In Hosanna-Tabor, a church school terminated the employment of 
a teacher who had been commissioned as a minister of the church. The 
minister-teacher sued the church under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA).199 The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held the church 
immune from such suit pursuant to a “ministerial exception” compelled 
by the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amend-
ment.200 
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court vigorously endorses 
church autonomy in the employment context: both clauses of the First 
Amendment “bar the government from interfering with the decision of 
a religious group to fire one of its ministers.”201 Consequently, legisla-
tion like the Act cannot impinge on “the employment relationship be-
 
 195 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1812 (2010). 
 196 Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 399 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (parenthesis in original). 
 197 Marci A. Hamilton, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (Ret.): The Endorsement Factor, 43 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 349 (2011). 
 198 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 199 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101–12300 (West 2012). 
 200 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710. 
 201 Id. at 702. 
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tween a religious institution and its ministers.”202 To hold otherwise 
would permit government “interfere[nce] with the internal governance 
of the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those 
who will personify its beliefs.”203 To rephrase the Chief Justice’s analysis 
in entanglement terms, permitting the Act to apply to the relationship 
between churches and their ministers would lead to constitutionally 
unacceptable enforcement entanglement between church and state as 
administrative and judicial institutions enforcing the Act intrude into 
churches’ “internal governance.”204 
While a ministerial exception alleviates enforcement entanglement 
between church and state, it necessarily creates borderline entanglement 
as the exception requires the determination of who is a minister to 
whom the exception applies. Here, the Court’s unanimity dissipated. 
Chief Justice Roberts, for a majority of the Court, declined “to adopt a 
rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister.”205 
In a carefully limited formulation, he declared that the teacher-minister 
before the Court was a minister because of her “formal title,”206 “the 
substance reflected in that title,”207 “her own use of that title”208 includ-
ing her claim of the parsonage allowance exclusion,209 and “the im-
portant religious functions she performed.”210 Concurring separately, 
Justice Thomas instead proposed that, for purposes of the ministerial 
exception mandated by the First Amendment, the courts should “defer 
to a religious organization’s good-faith understanding of who qualifies 
as its minister.”211 From Justice Thomas’s vantage point, a person is a 
minister for purposes of the exception if the religious organization “sin-
cerely consider[s]” that person to be a minister.212 
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Kagan, instead took “a functional 
approach”213 under which an individual’s “title is neither necessary or 
sufficient”214 to make that individual qualify for the ministerial excep-
tion. Instead, under Justice Alito’s functional approach, “ministers” 
include “those who serve in positions of leadership, those who perform 
important functions in worship services and in the performance of reli-
 
 202 Id. at 705. 
 203 Id. at 706. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. at 707. 
 206 Id. at 708. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. 
 210 Id. 
 211 Id. at 710. 
 212 Id. at 711. 
 213 Id. at 714. 
 214 Id. at 713. 
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gious ceremonies and rituals, and those who are entrusted with teaching 
and conveying the tenets of the faith to the next generation.”215 
As this division of opinion indicates, determining who is a “minis-
ter” for purposes of the constitutionally compelled “ministerial exemp-
tion” will enmesh churches and the courts just as do borderline deter-
minations of who qualifies as a minister for purposes of the parsonage 
allowance exclusion. Under all three tests unveiled in Hosanna-Tabor, 
there will be enmeshing inquiries at the boundaries of the ministerial 
exception: What “religious functions” did the alleged minister perform? 
Is the church “sincere” in its characterization of an individual as a min-
ister? What are “positions of leadership” in a particular religious organi-
zation? 
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court, by recognizing a First Amendment 
ministerial exception to the ADA, elected for the judiciary to confront 
these kinds of entangling questions at the borderline of the exception to 
protect church autonomy from enforcement entanglement. In the mod-




The controversy over the constitutionality of Section 107 is im-
portant and wide-ranging in its implications. If, as contemporary oppo-
nents of Section 107 argue, the income tax exclusion that section grants 
to “minister[s] of the gospel” unconstitutionally entangles church and 
state, so too do the equivalent religious exemptions from the new federal 
health mandate and from the FICA and Social Security taxes. I ultimate-
ly conclude that this argument is unpersuasive. 
In the contemporary tax context, extensive contact between tax 
systems and religious institutions is inexorable, whether religious insti-
tutions and personnel are taxed or exempted. In this setting, there are 
no disentangling alternatives. 
If religious entities and actors are taxed, they are subjected to the 
inherently intrusive relationship between the tax collector and the tax-
payer. If religious entities and actors are not taxed, there are inevitable 
tensions policing the boundaries of exemption. The choice between 
borderline entanglement and enforcement entanglement is inherent in 
the relationship between the modern state’s tax system and contempo-
rary religious institutions and their personnel. By exempting, Congress 
chooses the problems of borderline entanglement over the quandaries of 
enforcement entanglement, an imperfect but plausible choice given the 
inevitable trade-offs between different forms of entanglement. 
 
 215 Id. at 712. 
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Consequently, Section 107 and its exclusion from gross income for 
clerical recipients of in-kind housing and parsonage allowances are con-
stitutionally permitted, though not constitutionally required, responses 
to the problems of entanglement inherent in the relationship between 
modern government and religion. In the case of housing provided to 
clergy in-kind, the valuation and liquidity difficulties of taxing noncash 
income would make the entanglement of church and state particularly 
acute and make persuasive Congress’s decision in Section 107 to avoid 
such entangling taxation. 
Similarly, the Code’s sectarian exemptions from the individual 
health coverage mandate and from the Social Security taxes are accepta-
ble, though not obligatory, means under the First Amendment of man-
aging the inevitable contacts and tensions between the tax system of the 
contemporary state and the religious community. Through these ex-
emptions, Congress elects borderline entanglement at the boundaries of 
exemption over the enforcement entanglement which results when reli-
gious institutions and actors are taxed or when believers are required to 
purchase health insurance to which they object on religious grounds. 
The constitutionality of the parsonage allowance exclusion should 
not be confused with the exclusion’s advisability as a matter of tax poli-
cy. Since such allowances are paid to “minister[s] of the gospel” in cash, 
there is, as a matter of tax policy, no convincing reason to exclude such 
allowances from ministers’ gross income as such allowances pose nei-
ther valuation difficulties nor liquidity issues for clerical taxpayers. 
However, in First Amendment terms, Section 107 is a permissible con-
stitutional choice for managing the inevitable entanglement between 
church and state under modern tax systems. 
